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INTRODUCTION

Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, is among the world’s most
polarizing political figures.2 To some, he is a heroic military leader who
stopped Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, then transformed himself into to a
politician and guided his people toward peace and prosperity. 3 To
2. See Jeffrey Gettleman, The Global Elite’s Favorite Strongman, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 4,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/magazine/paul-kagame-rwanda.html?mcubz=3
[https://perma.cc/24W6-UEBR] (archived Oct. 26, 2017); see also infra notes 110-21 and
accompanying text.
3. See PATRICIA CRISAFULLI & ANDREA REDMOND, RWANDA, INC.: HOW A DEVASTATED
NATION BECAME AN ECONOMIC MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD 92 (2012) (arguing
Paul Kagame has the attributes of a successful corporate CEO, that he runs Rwanda like a
business, and that the country’s success is due to his leadership); see also STEPHEN KINZER, A
THOUSAND HILLS: RWANDA’S REBIRTH AND THE MAN WHO DREAMED IT 337 (2008) (arguing
that Kagame is the “man of the hour in modern Africa”); Philip Gourevitch, Letter from the
Congo: Continental Shift, NEW YORKER (Aug. 4, 1997), at 42 (praising Kagame as a new type
of African leader); infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
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others, he is a bloodthirsty dictator who deploys his army to pillage
neighboring countries and his security forces to intimidate, imprison,
or assassinate all who question his rule.4 This article will not resolve
the question of whether Paul Kagame is a savior or a villain. It is
possible, of course, that he is both. It will, however, confirm that the
Kagame regime is engaged in a comprehensive, sophisticated effort to
reprogram Rwandans’ collective memory and thereby legitimize its
increasingly dictatorial rule.
The US government and its people should care about what
happens in Rwanda. The obligation is based partly on history. In 1994,
US actions and inactions exacerbated a slaughter that killed an
estimated 800,000 human beings.5 The US obligation is also based on
contemporary geopolitics. At present, the United States gives Rwanda
approximately US$200 million in aid every year, making us by far its
largest bilateral donor.6 If our money is going to Rwanda, and if the
Rwandan government is oppressing its own people, we are at least
indirectly complicit.
Legal scholars and human rights activists who have written about
political oppression in contemporary Rwanda tend to focus on what
Americans would consider “First Amendment” concerns, particularly
the Kagame regime’s aggressive silencing of perceived political
opponents.7 This paper argues that this “freedom of expression” lens is
4 . See Briefing, Paul Kagame, feted and feared, THE ECONOMIST (July 15, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21724982-rwanda-more-prosperous-country-everit-also-repressed-one-paul-kagame [https://perma.cc/CK97-CCX8] (archived Oct. 26, 2017);
see also Howard W. French, The Case Against Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame, NEWSWEEK
(Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.newsweek.com/case-against-rwandas-president-paul-kagame63167 [https://perma.cc/FA8P-W42N] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (quoting the Rwanda scholar
Filip Reyntjens as claiming President Kagame is “probably the worst war criminal in office
today”); infra notes 119-26.
5. See infra notes 91-96 (discussing the US’s role in facilitating the Rwandan genocide;
see also infra note 78 (discussing disagreement about the exact number of dead).
6 . See Compare your country: Aid statistics by donor, recipient and sector,
O RGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC C OOPERATION AND D EVELOPMENT (OECD),
http://www2.compareyourcountry.org/aid-statistics?cr=302&lg=en&page=1
[https://perma.cc/XF6V-6RY2] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (showing the US as Rwanda’s largest
governmental donor at almost $200 million per year).
7. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Allen & George H. Norris, Is Genocide Different?: Dealing with
Hate Speech in a Post-Genocide Society, 7 J. OF INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 146, 147 (2011); YakareOule (Nani) Jansen, Denying Genocide or Denying Free Speech? A Case Study of the
Application of Rwanda’s Genocide Denial Laws, 12 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 191, 191 (2014);
Joseph Sebarenzi, Justice and Human Rights for All Rwandans, in REMAKING RWANDA: STATE
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too narrow to understand fully what is taking place in Rwanda today.
Instead, the paper borrows theoretical concepts from historiography
and memory studies, and argues that Rwanda’s government is
surpassing mere suppression of speech and instead is engaging in a
tightly managed effort to establish and enforce a fanciful version of
history that legitimizes the Kagame regime’s increasingly autocratic
rule. The regime, to the extent it admits its actions, justifies them as
necessary to maintain stability and avoid a repeat of the country’s
horrific genocide. 8 But abundant evidence indicates that President
Kagame is tailoring memory and history not to maintain stability, but
to keep himself and his ruling coterie in power.
The Rwandan government’s program of “memory
entrepreneurship” 9 relies partly on law as a tool for political
oppression, but understanding the full scope of the oppression requires
explorations beyond the realm of law. Part II of the paper will begin
with history, providing an overview of Rwanda that focuses particular
attention on the years leading up to the 1994 genocide. Part III will
introduce helpful theoretical concepts from historiography and
memory studies, and then will deploy those concepts in examining
competing versions of Rwanda’s history: the self-serving narrative
insisted upon by the Kagame regime, and the narrative generally agreed
upon by historians and other scholars. Part IV turns back to law,
describing the legal (and in some cases, extralegal) methods Rwanda’s
government uses to enforce its self-justifying, ahistorical narrative. Part
V concludes by positing that the Rwandan government’s efforts to
control history and memory are a symptom of creeping dictatorship.
Even allowing for the fact that strong leadership is needed in a country
that suffered a horrific genocide less than a generation ago, its actions
BUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER MASS VIOLENCE 343-49 (Scott Straus & Lars Waldorf
eds., 2011).
8 . See A MNESTY INTERNATIONAL, R WANDA: J USTICE IN J EOPARDY: THE FIRST
INSTANCE TRIAL OF V ICTOIRE I NGABIRE 9 (2013); see also Allen & Norris, supra note 7, at
147 (arguing that the government restricts speech to avoid reigniting the conflict); Scott Straus
& Lars Waldorf, Introduction: Seeing Like a Post-Conflict State, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra
note 7, at 8 (arguing the regime’s central justification is that the prior social order produced the
genocide, so radical social change is needed to prevent a future reoccurrence); Laura Seay, Is
Rwanda’s Authoritarian State Sustainable?, WASHINGTON POST (June 3, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/03/is-rwandasauthoritarian-state-sustainable/ [https://perma.cc/F3GV-P5NM] (archived Oct. 26, 2017)
(similar).
9. See generally infra note 139 and accompanying text (explaining the term “memory
entrepreneurship”).
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appear to be more geared toward maintaining power than maintaining
peace.
II. RWANDA, ITS GENOCIDE, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENT
PAUL KAGAME
Most non-specialists know one thing about Rwanda, which is that
in 1994 it experienced genocide. Later sections of this paper will
closely analyze competing historical narratives about what caused the
genocide and exactly what happened once it began. In the meantime,
this section provides an overview relying on facts that are, at least for
the most part, uncontested.
Rwanda is a small, beautiful, hilly, landlocked, densely
populated10 country in east Africa.11 Its economy relies on agricultural
production and animal husbandry,12 though the government would like
to shift over time toward an “information economy.”13 The country is
populated by three “ethnic” groups: Hutu (85% of the population),
Tutsi (14% of the population), and Twa (1% of the population). 14
10. See John W. Bruce, Return of Land in Post-Conflict Rwanda: International Standards,
Improvisation, and the Role of International Humanitarian Organizations, in LAND AND POSTCONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 121, 122 (Jon Unruh & Rhodri C. Williams eds., 2013) (arguing
Rwanda has one of the highest ratios of people to arable land in the world); Catharine Newbury,
High Modernism at the Ground Level: The Imidugudu Policy in Rwanda, in REMAKING
RWANDA, supra note 7, at 223-24 [hereinafter Newbury, High Modernism] (arguing Rwanda
has one of the highest population densities and lowest rates of urbanization in Africa); David
Newbury & Catharine Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back in: Agrarian Themes in the
Construction and Corrosion of Statist Historiography in Rwanda, 105 AM. HIST. REV. 832, 837
(2000) [hereinafter Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In] (arguing Rwanda is
a tiny, densely packed country of 10,000 square miles – about the size of Vermont – with a
current population of 7.5 million compared to Vermont’s 600,000).
11. See Composition of Macro Geographical (Continental) Regions, Geographical SubRegions, and Selected Economic and Other Groupings, UNITED NATIONS,
http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm [https://perma.cc/JXH4AGDF] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
12. See Newbury, High Modernism, supra note 10, at 223 (arguing most Rwandans rely
on agricultural production for their survival).
13 . See generally K IGALI, R EPUBLIC OF R WANDA MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND
ECONOMIC PLANNING, R WANDA V ISION 2020 (July 2000); An Ansoms, Rwanda’s PostGenocide Economic Reconstruction: The Mismatch Between Elite Ambitions and Rural
Realities, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 240 [hereinafter Ansoms, Reconstruction]
(arguing Rwanda’s government plans to transform from a “low human development” country to
medium, as defined by the United Nations Human Development Index).
14. See David Newbury, Understanding Genocide, 41 AFR. STUD. REV. 73, 78 (1998).
David and Catharine Newbury argue the Twa, sometimes referred to as “pygmy,” are often
overlooked in political analysis due to their low numbers and are “usually relegated to the status
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However, as discussed in Part III.B and C, there is controversy over
whether those groups are indeed different ethnicities since they speak
a single language, 15 Kinyarwanda, and historically lived together,
frequently intermarried, and worshiped the same gods.16
Germany was Rwanda’s first colonial ruler but its influence on
the country was limited and its tenure brief.17 After Germany’s loss in
World War I, The League of Nations assigned Belgium as Rwanda’s
European protector. 18 Belgium settled in as a typical colonial ruler,
imposing harsh policies similar to those implemented by other
colonizing powers across Africa. They forced farmers to grow cash
crops such as coffee, 19 which made those farmers vulnerable to

of exotic appendages to Rwandan society.” Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back
In, supra note 10, at 840.
15 . Language is an area of political contestation in Rwanda. French was Rwanda’s
colonial language and until recently was the primary language of higher education and
government. See Chris McGreal, Why Rwanda said adieu to French, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 16,
2009), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2009/jan/16/rwanda-english-genocide [https://
perma.cc/XP2L-JMLE] (archived Oct. 26, 2017). But in 2009, the Kagame regime announced
an abrupt switch to English. Its purported reason was that English would facilitate economic
integration with Rwanda’s English-speaking East African neighbors. Id. Others saw politics in
the switch: Rwanda holds France partly responsible for the 1994 genocide and has taken steps
to distance itself, including moving away from the French language. Id.; see also infra notes 4849, 83-90 and accompanying text (discussing France’s role in facilitating the genocide). Also,
Paul Kagame and his ruling coterie grew up in exile in English-speaking countries, see infra
note 85 and accompanying text, and their command of French is limited. Id. The disruptive effect
of the switch was mitigated by the fact that all Rwandans speak Kinyarwanda and government
business is often conducted in that language. See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM
YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 55 (1998) [hereinafter
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU].
16. See Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 78.
17. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, which carved up Africa and awarded it to
various European powers, assigned Rwanda and Burundi (then a single entity known as RuandaUrundi and part of German East Africa) to Germany. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM
YOU, supra note 15, at 57. However, because present-day Rwanda was remote and inaccessible,
Germans did not actually arrive on the scene until 1897. Id. at 54. In 1922, after Germany’s loss
in World War I, a League of Nations mandate assigned the territory to Belgium, which ruled in
various forms until independence in 1961. Id. at 54, 61; Jean-Marie Kamatali, State Building in
Rwanda, in RECONSTRUCTING THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE IN AFRICA 162 (George Klay Kieh,
Jr. & Pita Ogaba eds., 2014).
18. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 54, 61.
19. See Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In, supra note 10, at 862
(arguing that by the end of the 1950s coffee represented more than 70% of the export earnings
of Ruanda-Urundi); see also Newbury, High Modernism, supra note 10, at 226 (arguing Belgian
colonists pushed coffee production and generally “intruded in rural production”).

2017]

MANIPULATING MEMORY IN RWANDA

85

famine. 20 They compelled their subjects to engage in burdensome
forced labor, which placed further strain on household livelihoods.21
They implemented a typical divide and conquer strategy by which they
selected a minority group – in this case the Tutsi people – and favored
them with education and official government positions while using
them to rule over the majority – in this case mostly Hutu people.22
Part III of this paper will discuss disagreements over whether the
Tutsi and Hutu people are in fact distinct ethnic groups, but the
Belgians assumed they were and they favored the Tutsi for reasons that
strike modern ears as disturbingly racist. 23 The Tutsis, at least to
Belgians eyes, were taller and had somewhat lighter skin, higher
foreheads, thinner faces, and more aquiline noses.24 In other words,
their features were closer to those of Europeans, which, the Belgians
assumed, meant they had some northern blood running in their veins
and, concomitantly, were superior to the supposedly darker, rounder,
more compact Hutu.25 Beginning in the 1930s, the Belgians required
20. See Ansoms, Reconstruction, supra note 13, at 244 (arguing the Belgians imposed
crops and that monocropping prevented farmers from diversifying to spread the risk of crop
failure and uncontrollable market fluctuations); Thomas Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets Into
Pigeon Holes: The Effects of Globalization and State Legal Reform in Niger on Indigenous
Zarma Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 635, 651, n.73 (2002) (arguing that French-imposed
cash cropping schemes led to famine in times of drought).
21. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 57 (arguing that the
Belgians imposed forced labor, mostly on Hutu subjects). There is now a rich English-language
literature chronicling the Rwandan genocide. Philip Gourevitch, who was among the first
American journalists to write about the genocide and its aftermath, is criticized by some scholars
for getting parts of the story – including parts of Rwanda’s history – wrong. See, e.g., Jens
Meierhenrich, Topographies of Remembering and Forgetting: The Transformation of “Lieux de
Memoire” in Rwanda, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 288 (arguing Gourevitch is a
mere “casual observer of things Rwandan”). He also has been publicly chastised for glossing
over allegations that the Kagame regime has committed war crimes and crimes against
humanity. See, e.g., Jason Stearns & Federico Borello, Bad Karma: Accountability for Rwandan
Crimes in the Congo, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 155 [hereinafter Stearns &
Borello, Bad Karma] (arguing Gourevitch’s later writings on Rwanda unfairly stereotype Hutu
refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo as collectively guilty of genocide). Still,
Gourevitch’s book is, to my mind, the most thoroughly descriptive and engaging journalistic
account of the genocide.
22. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 51, 55-56.
23. Id. at 55-56 (describing the racial and racist nature of European hypotheses about the
origins of Hutus and Tutsis).
24. Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In, supra note 10, at 838-39.
25. See id. at 839 (arguing that Europeans incorrectly considered the Hutu to be “short,
sturdy, and dark,” in comparison to Tutsi); see also David Newbury, Canonical Conventions in
Rwanda: Four Myths of Recent Historiography in Central Africa, 39 H IST. IN A FR. 41, 50
(2012) [hereinafter Newbury, Canonical Conventions] (describing the racist “Hamitic
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all Rwandans to obtain identity cards that, among other things,
specified their ethnicity.26 These cards were still in use when the 1994
genocide began and, tragically, helped make the slaughter more
targeted and efficient.27
In the 1950s, winds of change28 blew across the African continent,
including Rwanda. For political and social reasons too complicated to
parse here, Rwanda’s Hutu majority began in the late 1940s demanding
full representation in governance, and the Belgian colonial regime,
along with the Catholic church that helped rule the country,29 switched
allegiance and began backing Hutu aspirations.30 As Rwandan Hutus
asserted control, the Tutsi minority suffered systematic violence and
deprivation. 31 Between 1959 and 1961, on the eve of Rwandan
independence, Hutus engaged in widespread attacks against Tutsi
people that killed many and destroyed countless homes.32 As a result,
an estimated 250,000 Tutsis fled into exile, mostly to neighboring
countries.33 This Tutsi diaspora played an important role in more recent
Rwandan history, partly because Paul Kagame’s family was among the
many who sought refuge in neighboring Uganda.34

Hypothesis” and arguing that Tutsis invoked it in support of their superiority while Hutus
invoked it to show that they had prior claims to the land).
26. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 56-57.
27. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 223 (arguing that
identity cards had served as “death tickets” during the genocide); Linda Melvern, The Past is
Prologue: Planning the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, in A FTER G ENOCIDE : TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, POST- CONFLICT R ECONSTRUCTION AND R ECONCILIATION IN R WANDA AND
B EYOND 22 (Philip Clark & Zachary D. Kaufman eds., 2008).
28. In 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan delivered his now famous “Wind
of Change” speech in Cape Town, South Africa. See Frank Myers, Harold Macmillan’s “Winds
of Change” Speech: A Case Study in Rhetoric of Policy Change, 3 R HETORIC AND PUB. A FF.
555 (Winter 2000). He acknowledged that African nationalist aspirations were legitimate and
that independence for African countries was inevitable. See id; see generally Ritchie Ovendale,
Macmillan and the Winds of Change in Africa, 1957-1960, 38 THE H IST. J. 455 (June 1995).
29. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 56.
30. See generally Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In, supra note 10, at
839 (describing the Hutu political emergence in the 1950s).
31. Catherine Newbury & David Newbury, A Catholic Mass in Kigali: Contested Views
of the Genocide and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 33 CAN. J. AFR. STUD. 292, 297-99 (1999) [hereinafter
Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass] (discussing ethnicity-based attacks on Tutsis and limits
on Tutsi admission to schools and government jobs).
32. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 59-60.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 211.
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After gaining independence in 1961, Rwanda settled into a
sustained period of Hutu rule and Tutsi deprivation. In 1973, the army
chief of staff, a Hutu named Juvenal Habyarimana, launched a
successful coup d’état against the sitting president, also a Hutu, and
ruled until April 6, 1994, the day the genocide began.35 Habyarimana
began as a comparative moderate in the matter of Hutu/Tutsi relations,
but over time his regime became increasingly dominated by a group of
hardliners associated with his wife, Agethe Habyarimana, and her clan
from Rwanda’s northwestern region.36 Those hardliners were known as
the akuzu (“little house” in Kinyarwanda) 37 and it was they who
resisted reconciliation and power sharing with the Tutsi and who
meticulously planned the genocide.38
While Habyarimana was ruling Rwanda, Paul Kagame was
gaining experience and influence in neighboring Uganda. 39 His
professional and personal trajectory was fascinating and complicated,
but for purposes of this overview it must suffice to say that he joined
the Ugandan military, rose through the ranks, and eventually became
its chief of military intelligence. 40 At the same time Kagame was
serving the Ugandan army, he and a small group of Tutsi associates
began laying plans to create their own army, 41 one they planned to
incubate from within the Ugandan army and then use to invade
Rwanda, topple Habyarimana’s regime, make Rwanda safe for Tutsis,
and permit the refugees’ return to their homeland. 42 This shadow
military force eventually became associated with a Uganda-based
political movement known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”).43
By the late 1980s, the RPF army was in the process of splitting
off from the Ugandan military in preparation for invading Rwanda.44
In 1990, Kagame’s friend and RPF comrade in arms, Fred Rwigyema,
led approximately 4,000 mostly Tutsi troops over the Ugandan border
into northern Rwanda, marking the beginning of what some refer to as
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 76-77.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id. at 211, 213-14.
Id.
KINZER, supra note 3, at 47-52.
Id. at 48-50.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 55.
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the Rwandan Civil War.45 Rwigyema was killed soon after the start of
the RPF advance 46 and his troops performed poorly. 47 Although
Rwanda’s Hutu army, the Forces Armees Rwandaises (“FAR”), never
enjoyed a reputation for battlefield prowess, 48 French troops 49
bolstered the FAR by directly engaging and repelling the advancing
Tutsis.50
Upon Rwigyema’s death, Kagame took over control of the RPF
army. 51 He led its withdrawal into the remote and rugged Virunga
Mountains in Rwanda’s extreme northwest and began a process of
rigorous retraining and refitting.52 When the RPF army emerged from
the mountains in early 1991 and began a series of hit and run attacks
inside of Rwanda, it proved disciplined and fierce53 and made rapid
progress against the FAR. By all accounts, Kagame was an extremely
effective leader of his troops and a masterly military tactician and
strategist.54
By the early 1990s, pressure was mounting on President
Habyarimana to democratize Rwanda and to treat Tutsis – including
45. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 217 (noting that
Kagame was not present at the outbreak of hostilities because he was receiving military training
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas).
46. See id; KINZER, supra note 3, at 67.
47. See KINZER, supra note 3, at 67, 78.
48 . See KINZER, supra note 3, at 77-78, 117 (arguing Rwanda’s national army was
“notoriously inept”); DANIELA KROSLAK, THE ROLE OF FRANCE IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
131 (2007) (arguing the French, who knew the Hutu army well, believe it “sclerotic” and
incapable of winning the war on its own); Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note
31, at 304 (similar).
49. See generally infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (describing France’s support
for the genocidal Habyarimana regime).
50. See KROSLAK, supra note 48, at 125 (referring to unproven rumors that French troops
were directly involved in the war effort); see also GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU,
supra note 15, at 89 (arguing that “hundreds of superbly equipped French paratroopers” kept the
RPF from advancing); KINZER, supra note 3, at 77-78 (arguing the RPF’s defeat in 1990 was
because “France had come to its client’s rescue”).
51. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 217.
52. See id. at 89 (arguing Kagame and the RPF trained his force into “a fierce and fiercely
disciplined” guerilla army); KINZER, supra note 3, at 80-81 (arguing the RPF licked its wounds
and reconstituted itself in the mountains).
53 . See KINZER, supra note 3, at 172 (arguing the RPF army was cohesive and
disciplined).
54. See id. at 78, 97 (arguing Kagame was known to be a clear strategic thinker, brave
fighter, and strict disciplinarian and that his first year leading the RPF army was a “resounding
success”); see also GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 218 (arguing
that many consider Kagame’s 1994 military campaign a “work of plain genius”).
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diaspora Tutsis – fairly. Part of that pressure resulted from world
events.55 The United States and its allies had recently won the Cold
War and new rules of the international game dictated that countries
receiving aid, including Rwanda, would have to move rapidly toward
democratic governance. 56 Pressure also resulted from the fact that
Kagame and the RPF continued to demonstrate prowess on the
battlefield.57
In 1992, Kagame agreed to a ceasefire and committed to
participating in negotiations to end the conflict.58 The talks took place
primarily in Arusha, Tanzania, and resulted in a complicated power
sharing agreement that became known as the Arusha Accords.59 For
purposes of this overview, it must suffice to say that President
Habyarimana reluctantly agreed to various compromises, but that he
was consistently opposed and undermined by the akazu60 hardliners
associated with his wife, Madam Agethe Habyarimana. 61 When it
appeared that the Arusha process might actually succeed, they began
planning62 their own final solution to what they viewed as Rwanda’s
Tutsi problem.63 They stockpiled weapons64 and organized and trained
local militias, 65 including the infamous interahamwe, who were the
55. See Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 89 (arguing that pressure
from inside and outside Rwanda compelled President Habyarimana to democratize).
56. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 82; Newbury,
Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 80.
57. See KINZNER, supra note 3, at 103-04 (discussing the RPF’s military success and Paul
Kagame’s threat of further military action to strengthen his hand in the Arusha negotiations).
58. KINZER, supra note 3, at 103.
59. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 99; Newbury,
Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 89-90 (arguing that the Arusha Accords did not
really require democratization and instead merely committed to power sharing among Hutu and
Tutsi political elites).
60. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 14, at 99; Newbury,
Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 79, 89.
61. See POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 337; see also GOUREVITCH,
WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 80-82 (arguing the akazu “tightened its grip on the
machinery of state” in reaction President Habyarimana’s agreement to democratize); KINZER,
supra note 3, at 92 (arguing Habyarimana was simultaneously pressured by France to
democratize and the akazu to crack down); Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note
31, at 294-96 (similar).
62. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 294-96.
63. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 94 (arguing by 1994 Hutus
were using the term “final solution”); KINZER, supra note 3, at 104, 109 (same).
64. See POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 337 (arguing the hardliners
stockpiled more than a half million machetes, one for every third Hutu adult male in Rwanda).
65. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 93.
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most prominent of the militias that carried out a great deal of the
killing. 66 They compiled lists of prominent Tutsis and politically
moderate Hutus who would be the first to die.67 And they implemented
a comprehensive media strategy, relying primarily on radio and
newspapers, to dehumanize Tutsis and prepare Hutu civilians for the
work of exterminating their neighbors.68
On April 6, 1994, a missile felled an airplane carrying President
Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart, Cyprien Ntaryamira, as it
was returning to Kigali after a round of consultations in Tanzania.69
Nobody has proved who shot down the plane.70 Many, including the
present-day Rwandan government, claim that Hutu akazu hardliners
ordered the downing knowing it would furnish an excuse to implement
the final solution.71 Others blame Paul Kagame and the RPF.72 What
no one disputes is that the genocide began within minutes of the plane’s
impact.73

66. Id. at 93 (arguing the interahamwe were “first among [the] militias”); Newbury,
Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 91-92 (describing the recruitment and actions of
local militias).
67. See MICHAEL N. BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
RWANDA 77-78 (2002) (arguing the hardliners stockpiled weapons, made lists, and organized
death squads); GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 93, 114 (referring to
kill lists drawn up by the interahamwe militias and the Presidential Guard); Samantha Power,
Bystanders to Genocide, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter Power, Bystanders to
Genocide],
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/
304571/ [https://perma.cc/88JG-NQKP] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing Hutu hardliners
had prepared kill lists and that Radio Mille Collines broadcast names, addresses, and licenseplate numbers of those who would be targeted first).
68. See Allen & Norris, supra note 7, at 149; see also GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM
YOU, supra note 15, at 85-88, 95 (describing the akazu’s use of media to dehumanize Tutsis);
KINZER, supra note 3, at 109-110 (arguing the akazu used radio broadcasts, particularly by
Radio-Television Libre de Mille Collines (RTLM) to stir hatred and instruct on how to kill with
homemade weapons); Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 295 (similar).
69. See KINZER, supra note 3, at 137-38; Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note
14, at 79.
70 . See Lars Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide: The RPF’s Campaign Against
Genocide Ideology, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 50-51 [hereinafter Waldorf,
Instrumentalizing Genocide] (describing recent conflicting accounts of who was responsible).
71. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 113 (arguing akazu
hardliners were the most likely culprits); KINZNER, supra note 3, at 139.
72. See KINZER, supra note 3, at 139; see also Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide,
supra note 70, at 50 (arguing that French anti-terrorist Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere charged
Kagame and his top military advisors with bringing down the plane).
73. See Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 80; see also GOUREVITCH,
WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 113 (arguing “the organizers of the genocide were
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The killing began in Kigali as the akazu and their collaborators
hunted down and slaughtered the individuals on their carefully
prepared lists.74 Among the first to die was Agathe Uwilingiyimana,
the politically moderate Hutu prime minister75 who would have, had
she lived, been sworn in as the head of state after Habyarimana’s
death.76
The slaughter spread to the countryside, often organized and led
by the interahamwe militias.77 Over a period of one hundred days, an
estimated 800,000 78 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu 79 were
murdered. Much of the killing was retail: there was little reported use
of machine guns or bombs; most victims were chopped or bludgeoned
to death by neighbors and acquaintances.80 The slaughter stopped only
primed to exploit [Habyarimana’s] death instantaneously”); KINZER, supra note 3, at 138
(arguing that interahamwe had established roadblocks within an hour after the plane crash).
74. See generally supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing the compilation of kill
lists); see also Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 49, 49
(2011) [hereinafter Haskell & Waldorf, The Impunity Gap] (arguing the brutal killing was led
by the akazu and carried out by the national army, local militia groups, and ordinary citizens
urged to kill by the government).
75. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 114; Newbury,
Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 80.
76. See KINZER, supra note 3, at 140; see also SUSAN THOMSON, WHISPERING TRUTH
TO POWER: EVERYDAY RESISTANCE TO RECONCILIATION IN POSTGENOCIDE RWANDA 48
(2013) [hereinafter THOMSON, WHISPERING] (arguing the Hutu hardliners considered any Hutu
who did not support the killing of Tutsis as “moderate”); Newbury, Understanding Genocide,
supra note 13, at 80 (arguing the hardliners first targeted politically moderate Hutus).
77. See Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 78, 81 (arguing the killing
began in the capital and then “was directed throughout the country”).
78. The butcher’s bill has never been definitively settled. Most published estimates claim
800,000 deaths. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 133 (arguing
800,000 is the “best estimate”); Phil Clark & Zachary D. Kaufman, After Genocide, in A FTER
A G ENOCIDE, supra note 27, at xii (same). Some put the number of dead closer to 500,000. See
Haskell & Waldorf, The Impunity Gap, supra note 74, at 49 (arguing the genocide killed “more
than a half million people”). Still others claim the correct number is more than a million. See
POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 385 (quoting from a US official’s journal);
Jeffrey Gettleman, In Africa, Benjamin Netanyahu Looks for Friends, and U.N. Votes, for Israel,
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/world/africa/israel-africanetanyahu-uganda-kenya-rwanda.html?emc=eta1 [https://perma.cc/A9AV-LSBP] (archived
Oct. 26, 2017).
79. See generally supra note 76 and accompanying text; see also Timothy Longman, The
Undemocratic Nature of Transition in Rwanda, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 27
(arguing that the genocide perpetrators were worried about the moderating influence of civil
society and so targeted Hutus and Tutsis associated with those organizations).
80 . See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 115 (arguing
neighbors killed neighbors, doctors killed patients, and schoolteachers killed pupils); KINZER,
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when the RPF army – led by Paul Kagame – defeated the Hutu regime
and its army and either killed, captured or drove into exile the
genocidaires.81
Later sections of this paper will discuss the fact that the
international community gives Paul Kagame wide latitude, continuing
to support his government in spite of strong evidence of its human
rights abuses.82 Its blind support is rooted in its well-founded shame at
abetting the genocide.
Above all, the French were despicable. Fearing a general loss of
influence in Africa 83 and more specifically the spread of AngloAmerican influence on the continent84 (Kagame and most members of
the RPF had grown up in exile in Uganda and spoke English rather than
French), 85 France armed, 86 funded and trained the genocidaires. 87
Worse yet, it continued to protect and support the Hutu rump regime
supra note 3, at 164 (arguing soldiers and militiamen “cut” people they had known for years
including neighbors and coworkers); POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 334
(arguing that once the killing spread beyond Kigali it was carried out with knives, machetes, and
clubs).
81. Timeline: 100 days of genocide, BBC NEWS, (last updated Apr. 6, 2004, 8:42 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3580247.stm [https://perma.cc/A3DN-2VRW] (last visited
Oct. 26, 2017).
82. See generally infra notes 127-143 and accompanying text.
83. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 90 (arguing France
viewed francophone Africa as “a virtual extension of the motherland”); KINZER, supra note 3,
at 94-96 (similar); KROSLAK, supra note 48, at 56 (arguing that France believed its influence in
francophone Africa helped ensure its position on the world stage).
84. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 90; KINZER, supra note
3, at 130; Linda Melvern, France and Genocide: The Murky Truth, THE TIMES (LONDON), Aug.
8, 2008, at 25 (arguing that “[o]nce Rwanda was ‘lost’ to Anglophone influence, [French leaders
believed] French credibility in Africa would never recover.”).
85. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 90 (arguing “the fact that
the RPF had emerged out of Anglophone Uganda inspired the ancient French tribal phobia of
the Anglo-Saxon menace”).
86. See KROSLAK, supra note 48, at 140-42; see also GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM
YOU, supra note 15, at 104 (arguing France continued to deliver arms to the Hutu government
in Kigali even after the Arusha Accords had declared Kigali a weapons-free zone); KINZER,
supra note 3, at 94 (arguing France during the early 1990s sold the Rwandan government more
than $20 million in arms and helped it buy five times that amount, including helicopters, tanks,
and missiles, from dealers in Egypt and South Africa).
87. See KROSLAK, supra note 48, at 99, 146-47 (arguing that the French government
“stood full square behind the Habyarimana regime” by equipping and training the Hutu army,
police, Presidential Guard and militias); see also BARNETT, supra note 67, at 88 (arguing France
was closely tied to the Hutu hardliners and supported them with training and equipment);
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 155 (referring to France’s “blatant
complicity in the preparation and implementation of the butchery”).
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long after it was apparent that it was perpetrating genocide. 88
Ultimately, many of the genocidaires who made it to the safety of
French lines were escorted over the border into Zaire (now the
Democratic Republic of Congo), some in ranks and carrying their
weapons,89 where they wreaked havoc on Rwanda and the rest of the
region for years to come.90
The French were not the only perfidious actors from the
international community. Americans were almost as bad. The United
States had recently experienced a military debacle in Mogadishu,
Somalia, and President Clinton and his administration wanted nothing
to do with chaotic African conflicts.91 Thus, not only did the US decline
to use its military might to stop the slaughter, 92 it aggressively
employed its political and economic power to prevent the United
Nations and other international bodies from taking decisive action.93
88. See KINZER, supra note 3, at 165, 174 (arguing that three months into the genocide
French President Mitterrand was still supplying weapons and field support to the Hutu army and
was determined to prevent an RPF victory); see also GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU,
supra note 15, at 89 (arguing the French continued huge arms shipments to Rwanda right through
the killings in 1994).
89. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 161; KINZER, supra
note 3, at 184; Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 82.
90. See Allen & Norris, supra note 7, at 150; see also KINZER supra note 3, at 188
(describing the ex-FAR’s rearming in Zaire and laying plans retake Rwanda); Newbury,
Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 83 (arguing that by permitting the FAR to escape to
Zaire, the French “set the stage for further violence in the region”); Filip Reyntjens, Waging
(Civil) War Abroad: Rwanda and the DRC, in REMAKING RWANDA supra note 7, at 133
(arguing the FAR who made it over the border into DRC planned to invade Rwanda and finish
the genocide); Philip Gourevitch, The Life After: Fifteen Years After the Genocide the
Reconciliation Defies Expectations, NEW YORKER (May 4, 2009), at ¶ 45 [hereinafter
Gourevitch, The Life After] (describing the post-genocide “war of infiltration” the ex-FAR
fought against Rwanda from its base in eastern Zaire).
91. See POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 357 (arguing that policy
makers in the Clinton administration drew an analogy to Somalia, not the Holocaust); Newbury
& Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 312; Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note
67, at 8.
92. Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 67, at 8 (arguing that the US even refused
to use its AWACS planes to jam the hate-spewing radio broadcasts on the ridiculous grounds
that it would be too expensive and might violate international law).
93. See POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 346, 359 (arguing the Clinton
administration blocked the U.N. Security Council from using the term “genocide” and
obfuscated the fact of genocide by promoting the notion that the conflict was caused by “ancient
tribal hatreds”). France also did its part to discourage United Nations action, partly by advising
the famously Francophile U.N. Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, to portray the conflict
as typical African chaos. See BARNETT, supra note 67, at 121; KINZER, supra note 3, at 118
(arguing Ghali was Francophile and easily influenced by French diplomats).
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The Clinton administration’s embarrassing and intellectually
dishonest94 reluctance to get involved was highlighted in an infamous
news conference in which a State Department spokesperson, under
orders not to admit that genocide was taking place in Rwanda95 (which
might have obligated the United States to take action), declared
absurdly that there was no proof of genocide but that “acts of genocide
may have occurred.”96
When the genocide and the war finally ended, the RPF, with Paul
Kagame at its head, took possession of a country in blood-soaked
ruins. 97 Rwanda’s economy, infrastructure, and institutions were
devastated.98 The judiciary, for example, could not function because its
personnel were dead or in exile and because its facilities had been
stripped right down to the light bulbs.99
The RPF got to work and over the following decades made
extraordinary advances in rebuilding Rwanda. 100 Many of the new
government’s policies have been controversial, including the use of
neo-traditional gacaca courts to try genocide perpetrators and clear the
enormous backlog of accused, and the forced resettlement of peasant
farmers in accordance with the country’s imidugudu (“villagization”)
94. See POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 354 (arguing by the second
day of the killing the US possessed sufficient intelligence to clearly demonstrate a genocide was
taking place).
95 . See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 153 (arguing
“Washington didn’t want to act. So Washington pretended that it wasn’t a genocide”); KINZER,
supra note 3, at 170 (arguing President Clinton’s administration was under orders not to use the
word “genocide” because it would create a moral, if not legal, responsibility to intervene);
Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 67, at 14 (arguing the administration avoided using
the “g-word” because it would harm its credibility if admitted a genocide was taking place but
did nothing);.
96. KINZER, supra note 3, at 171; Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 67, at 15
(arguing that the spokesperson’s responses were a “semantic dance”).
97. Gourevitch, The Life After, supra note 90, at 37 (arguing post-genocide Rwanda was
“blood-sodden and pillaged”).
98. See KINZER, supra note 3, at 177 (arguing that after the genocide Rwanda was
“shattered morally, politically, socially, and economically”); Gourevitch, The Life After, supra
note 90, at 37 (arguing the country’s infrastructure was trashed, its economy gutted and its court
system vitiated).
99. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 229; Allen & Norris,
supra note 7, at 155.
100 . See KINZER, supra note 3, at 1-2, 230 (describing Rwanda’s remarkable postgenocide recovery); see also Ansoms, Reconstruction, supra note 13, at 241 (arguing Rwanda’s
post-genocide economic recovery has been “exceptional”); Gourevitch, The Life After, supra
note 90, at 37 (arguing per-capital gross domestic product nearly tripled in the fifteen years after
the genocide).

2017]

MANIPULATING MEMORY IN RWANDA

95

policy, purportedly aimed at stimulating more efficient agricultural
production.101 But the country’s overall economic and social progress
has been exemplary 102 when measured by widely accepted
development indicators such as those that make up the UN
Development Index.103 Among many other improvements, Rwanda has
vastly increased child and adult literacy, made education more widely
available to girls and women, reduced infant and maternal mortality,
improved access to health care and health insurance, made it easier to
establish new businesses, significantly improved transportation and
communication infrastructures, and expanded the economy at an
impressive average of 9% per year over the past two decades.104 At the
same time, Rwanda has made impressive strides in battling
corruption.105
Not all of Rwanda’s development-related news is positive. Critics
argue that much of the country’s economic growth has redounded to
the benefit of an elite, urban, Anglophone, Tutsi community and that
the government has made comparatively little progress fighting rural
poverty. 106 Others accuse Rwanda of gaming the development
101. See generally infra notes 329-44 and accompanying text; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
WORLD REPORT 2001: RWANDA (2001).
102. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 12 (listing the Kagame regime’s many
achievements); Jansen, supra note 7, at 191 (arguing Rwanda’s previous ten years of GDP
growth averaged 7.4%, nearly double the regional average).
103 See World Bank, Main Report, (2014), http://documents.worldbank.org
/curated/en/2014/06/19712279/rwanda-country-partnership-strategy-period-fy2014-18-vol-23-accelerating-economic-growth [https://perma.cc/4VJY-5FMD] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017);
see also Jansen, supra note 7, at 1 (arguing Rwanda was the only country in sub-Saharan Africa
on pace to meet its Millennium Challenge Goals by 2015).
104. See Gourevitch, The Life After, supra note 90, at 37 (arguing there have been vast
improvements in access to health insurance, education, and more); United Nations Development
Programme, Rwanda Final MDG Progress Report: 2013 (Dec. 2014), http://www.rw.undp.
org/content/rwanda/en/home/library/mdg/-millenium-development-goals-rwanda-2015-.html
[https://perma.cc/7GPN-DQ7C ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). But see Ansoms, Reconstruction,
supra note 13, at 241- 42 (arguing that Rwanda’s economic growth has not been accompanied
by significant poverty reduction, and that much of the economic growth has benefitted only
elites).
105. Marie Chêne, Help-Desk Answer: Anti-Corruption Progress in Georgia, Liberia,
Rwanda, World Bank Grp., (2014), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/
19712279/rwanda-country-partnership-strategy-period-fy2014-18-vol-2-3-acceleratingeconomic-growth [https://perma.cc/6SHN-NXST] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
106. See An Ansoms, Re-Engineering Rural Society: The Visions and Ambitions of the
Rwandan Elite, 108 AFR. AFF. 289, 292 (2009) [hereinafter Ansoms, Re-Engineering Rural
Society] (arguing Rwandan elite seek to artificially upgrade rural life, “while hiding the extent
of poverty and inequality”); An Ansoms, Resurrection After Civil War and Genocide: Growth,
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numbers: reverse engineering how NGOs measure development
progress and implementing programs to boost their numbers, not
address real problems.107 Some even question Rwanda’s vaunted fight
against corruption, pointing out that the regime sometimes uses
corruption charges to punish political dissenters. 108 Still, Rwanda’s
progress since the genocide has been impressive.
All of this progress took place under Paul Kagame’s leadership.
Although he initially assumed the role of vice president in Rwanda’s
post-genocide government, ceding the presidency to a Hutu named
Pasteur Bizimungu, no one ever doubted that Kagame was in charge.109
When Bizimungu broke with Kagame over what he perceived to be
excessive suppression of political expression in the country, Kagame’s
loyalists attacked him on grounds of corruption, leading to his
resignation in 2000.110
Kagame ascended to the presidency, and, after winning two
highly questionable elections along the way,111 has been in that office
ever since. Although Rwanda’s constitution until recently limited the
president to two consecutive seven-year terms, which would have
meant the end of Kagame’s presidency in 2017, in 2015 he and his
Poverty and Inequality in Post-Conflict Rwanda, 17 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 495, 500 (2005) (arguing
there has been an “enormous shift of income from poor to rich”).
107. See Filip Reyntjens, Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics: Poverty Reduction RwandanStyle and How the Aid Community Loves It, AFRICAN ARGUMENTS (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://africanarguments.org/2015/11/03/lies-damned-lies-and-statistics-poverty-reductionrwandan-style-and-how-the-aid-community-loves-it/
[https://perma.cc/GWH2-RNW8]
(archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing Rwanda manipulates statistics to exaggerate its progress in
alleviating poverty and thereby blunt criticism about its poor human rights record); see also
Nicolas Germain, Rwanda Accused of Manipulating Poverty Statistics, FRANCE 24 (Nov. 2,
2015), http://www.france24.com/en/20151102-rwanda-accused-manipulating-poverty-statistics
[https://perma.cc/WKR9-REJD] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (similar).
108. See generally infra notes 110, 243 and accompanying text.
109. See Longman, supra note 79, at 32 (arguing that when Paul Kagame occupied the
offices of vice president and minister of defense, he “maintained real control” of the
government).
110. Chris McGreal, Tutsi Soldier to Lead Rwanda, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2000),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/mar/25/chrismcgreal [https://perma.cc/JU5L-4FY6]
(archived Oct. 26, 2017) (“Gen Kagame’s allies were quick to hit back at Mr Bizimungu by
saying he had resigned because he too faced a corruption investigation.”).
111 . See Rachel Haymen, Funding Fraud? Donors and Democracy in Rwanda, in
REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 118 (arguing that the RPF fraudulently fixes the results
of Rwandan elections); see generally Longman, supra note 79, at 26-27 (arguing Rwanda has
made the post-genocide transition under Kagame from one type of authoritarian regime to
another).
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regime carefully stage-managed a public outcry demanding that he
extend his leadership. 112 On cue, Rwanda’s people voted
overwhelmingly in favor of a referendum to extend the president’s
term. 113 Rwanda’s legislature in turn approved the constitutional
amendment. 114 The change virtually guarantees that Kagame will
remain president far into the future.
Today, Paul Kagame is among the world’s most polarizing
political figures.115 Some commentators celebrate him as a visionary
leader who is brilliant, disciplined, acetic, incorruptible, and who
demands efficiency and performance by everyone who works for
him.116 He pals around with Fortune 500 CEOs, is supported by highprofile private foundations,117 and is a frequent and much sought-after
participant in international think-fests such as the World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland.118
112. See Briefing, supra note 4; see also Phil Clark, Rwanda: Kagame Third Term Popular Support but a Wary Ruling Party, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Dec. 3, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-phil-clark/rwanda-kagame-third-term-_b_8703166.html
[https://perma.cc/RQ3A-CHS9] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing the petition was
“government-orchestrated” and that rural Rwandans reported being cajoled by local authorities
to sign the pro-Kagame petition multiple times); Claudine Vidal, How Paul Kagame Made
Himself Rwanda’s President for Life, RAND DAILY MAIL (Jan. 19, 2016),
http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2016/01/19/how-paul-kagame-made-himself-rwanda-spresident-for-life [https://perma.cc/GUT2-UC4L] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing the
government’s “orderly and sophisticated” campaign to extend Kagame’s presidency
“culminated with the production of a ‘spontaneous’ mass petition,” as the “final step of a
meticulously prepared political process…”).
113 . RWANDA: Successful Referendum, 52 AFR. RES. BULL.: POL. SOC. CULTURAL
SERIES 20815B–20816B (2016) [hereinafter Successful Referendum].
114. Id.
115. See generally Jeffrey Gettleman, The Global Elite’s Favorite Strongman, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/magazine/paul-kagame-rwanda.html?
mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/QT79-8YGB] (archived Oct. 26, 2017).
116. See CRISAFULLI & REDMOND, supra note 3, at 92 (arguing Paul Kagame has the
attributes of a successful corporate CEO, that he runs Rwanda like a business, and that the
country’s success is due to his leadership); see also KINZER, supra note 3, at 337 (arguing that
Kagame is the “man of the hour in modern Africa”); Gourevitch, Letter from the Congo, supra
note 3, at 42 (praising Kagame as a new type of African leader).
117. See generally Eugenia Zorbas, Aid Dependence and Policy Independence: Explaining
the Rwandan Paradox, in REMAKING R WANDA, supra note 7, at 108 (arguing that donors view
Kagame as a trustworthy partner and the RPF as indispensable to Rwandan development).
118. Gourevitch, The Life After, supra note 90, at 47; Anjan Sundaram, Rwanda: The
Darling Tyrant, POLITICO (March/Apr. 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014
/02/rwanda-paul-kagame-americas-darling-tyrant-103963
[https://perma.cc/RS3Y-7DRX]
(archived Nov. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Sundaram, Darling Tyrant] (arguing Kagame is a dictator
but “has a great many friends” including Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Bill Gates).
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And yet, others claim he is among the most prominent unindicted
war criminals in the world.119 Not only has he waged unimaginably
bloody 120 proxy wars 121 in neighboring Congo, 122 and allegedly
subsidized Rwanda’s economic miracle by illicitly extracting vast
mineral wealth from that country, 123 he has also engaged in violent
suppression of political dissent inside and outside of Rwanda.124 As
described in more detail in later parts of this paper, the list of jailed,
disappeared, and assassinated political opponents and independent
journalists is long and growing. His harshest critics claim that Rwanda
is being run for the economic benefit of a small, elite group of
Anglophone, diaspora Tutsis125 and that anyone who objects, including
Tutsi genocide survivors, risks immediate, brutal punishment or
worse.126
119. See French, supra note 4 (quoting the Rwanda scholar Filip Reyntjens as claiming
President Kagame is “probably the worst war criminal in office today”).
120. See Stearns & Borello, Bad Karma, supra note 21, at 154-55, 162 (arguing that the
RPA and its allies massacred hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees in Eastern Congo and
arguably committed genocide); see also Reyntjens, supra note 90, at 135 (referring to a U.N.
investigation concluding that the Rwandan Patriotic Army committed large-scale war crimes
and crimes against humanity in Zaire/Congo).
121. See Reyntjens, supra note 90, at 141 (referring to the Congo conflicts as Rwandan
proxy wars); and at 133 (arguing that Rwanda’s invasions of Congo evinced a “profound
disrespect for human life”).
122. See id. at 132 (arguing Rwanda has twice invaded Congo – in 1996 and 1998 – and
that the second invasion was largely about “exploitation of natural resources”); see also French,
supra note 4; Zorbas, supra note 117, at 112 (arguing that while donors looked the other way at
domestic political suppression, they began in 2004 to withhold support due to Rwanda’s military
involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
123. See French, supra note 4 (arguing that the proceeds from pillaging the Congo have
gone to the military and a small cadre of elite, urban Anglophone Tutsi returnees); Reyntjens,
supra note 90, at 139-40 (arguing that Rwanda has pillaged vast mineral wealth from the areas
it controlled in eastern Congo – including US$80 to $100 million in coltan alone, roughly the
equivalent of Rwanda’s annual defense budget – and that the regime used the money to buy
“needed domestic elite loyalty).
124 . See generally infra Part IV (describing systematic oppression in contemporary
Rwanda); Jansen, supra note 7, at 1 (arguing that Rwanda scores badly in measures of freedom
of expression and democracy).
125. See JEAN HATZFELD, THE ANTELOPE’S STRATEGY: LIVING IN RWANDA AFTER THE
GENOCIDE 90 (Linda Coverdale trans., Farrar et al. eds., 2009); French, supra note 4; Longman,
supra note 79, at 42.
126 . See Siobhan O’Grady, Former Rwandan Official Worries That Kagame’s
Administration is Backsliding Into Mass Murder, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/29/former-rwandan-official-worries-that-kagamesadminis%C2%ADtration-is-back%C2%ADsliding-into-mass-murder/ [https://perma.cc/LTC7HQSS] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing that a silence is settling over Rwanda as the Kagame
regime assassinates ever more political opponents and critics); see also Daniel Donova,
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III. MEMORY, HISTORY, AND POWER IN RWANDA
A.

Helpful Constructs from Memory Studies and Historiography

Until recently, memory was thought of as an individual
phenomenon and was considered the exclusive realm of psychologists,
psychoanalysts, and philosophers.127 But in the 1980s, memory studies,
an interdisciplinary field that sprang from the social sciences,128 began
viewing society itself as a remembering entity.129 Individuals within
societies formulate their own memories and their own versions of
history,130 but societies also form “collective” or “national” memories
through which nationally conscious individuals formulate a national
identity.131
Collective (or national) memory can, but does not necessarily,
grow organically from the recollections and discourses of a society’s
individuals. 132 Sometimes, entrenched elites within a given society
exercise their power to craft a particular collective memory: they
“instrumentalize” the past and enforce a version of memory and history
Kagame’s Iron Fist Stokes Fires in Rwanda, US NEWS (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/01/10/kagames-iron-fist-couldrekindle-rwandan-civil-war [https://perma.cc/Z2P6-23XB] (Archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing
Kagame’s regime operates in a manner “much closer to a criminal organization than a state,”
that anyone who contradicts the government is punished, and the press is run by the
government); HUMAN R IGHTS WATCH, R WANDA : R EPRESSION A CROSS B ORDERS :
A TTACKS AND T HREATS A GAINST R WANDAN O PPONENTS AND C RITICS A BROAD (Jan. 28,
2014) https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/28/rwanda-repression-across-borders [https://perma
.cc/JW4R-WJ46] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing that political opponents in Uganda, Kenya,
South Africa, and various countries in Europe have been threatened or attacked and that exiled
Rwandans believe “no one is out of reach” of the Kagame regime).
127 . OLIVIER NYIRUBUGARA, COMPLEXITIES AND DANGERS OF REMEMBERING AND
FORGETTING IN RWANDA 15 (2013).
128. See Jeffrey K. Olick & Joyce Robbins, Social Memory Studies: From Collective
Memory to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices, 24 Ann. Rev. Soc. 105, 108 (1998);
see also Jan-Werner Muller, Introduction: The Power of Memory, the Memory of Power, and
the Power Over Memory, in MEMORY AND POWER IN POST-W AR EUROPE : STUDIES IN THE
PRESENCE OF THE PAST 13 (Jan-Werner Muller ed., 2004) (arguing “[t]here has been an
explosion of literature on memory in recent years”); Henry L. Roediger, III & James V. Wertsch,
Creating a New Discipline of Memory Studies, in MEMORY STUD. 9-22 (2008) (discussing the
rise of memory studies as a discipline).
129. NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 15.
130. Muller, supra note 128, at 3.
131. Id. at 3.
132. See René Lemarchand, Genocide, Memory and Ethnic Reconciliation in Rwanda, in
L’AFRIQUE DES GRANDS LACS: ANNUAIRE 2006-2007 21, 28 (2007) (contrasting “historical
memory” from “collective memory”).
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that justifies their political domination.133 In places like these, history
and historiography become nationalist enterprises.134 History teachers
become tools of what in essence is state propaganda.135
Controlling collective memory becomes particularly important to
those who have prevailed in a civil war or other violent social
conflicts.136 Rwanda is a case in point. Shortly after taking power, the
RPF “embarked on a campaign to re-educate Rwandans (and outsiders)
about Rwanda’s past,” particularly the role that ethnicity played in the
country’s distant past and in the 1994 genocide.137 Not surprisingly, the
new version both supports the Kagame government’s claim to
legitimacy and absolves it of any responsibility for past wrongs. 138
Kagame, a former intelligence operative and thus a man who
presumably understands how to mold a collective consciousness, has
become a master of “memory entrepreneurship,” deft at manipulating
the past for present political purposes.139
This political manipulation is abhorrent to historians, including
the esteemed American scholar David Newbury, who describe it as the
133. See NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 49; René Lemarchand, The Politics of
Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in A FTER G ENOCIDE, supra note 27, at 64, 70-71
(referring to this phenomenon as “manipulated memory”); Olick & Robbins, supra note 128, at
110, 126; see also THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 75, at 53 (arguing “fabricating continuity
with the past in order to socially engineer the future is a common strategy of political elites”);
Berthold Molden, Resistant Pasts Versus Mnemonic Hegemony: On the Power Relations of
Collective Memory, in MEMORY STUD., supra note 128, at 125-35 (arguing that dominant
groups within societies use their hegemonic power to impose historical interpretations that
support their interests and compel the dominated groups to accept that the interests of the
dominant are the natural state of the world); Moritz Schuberth, The Politics of Knowledge
Production in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 35 STRATEGIC R EV. FOR S. A FR. 78, 80 (2013)
(arguing that fights over memory are often attempts to convince the public of a specific “truth”
that supports a specific political and economic agenda).
134. See Olick & Robbins, supra note 127, at 126; see also THOMSON, WHISPERING,
supra note 75, at 53 (arguing it is a common strategy of political elites to “fabricate continuity
with the past to socially engineer a future” to its liking).
135. See Nancy Honicker, ‘Douce France’ . . . Growing Rough Around the Edges?, 29
K ENYON R EV. 81, 84 (2007).
136. Muller, supra note 128, at 3.
137. Lyndsay McLean Hilker, Young Rwandans’ Narratives of the Past (and Present), in
REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 316.
138. Id. at 318; Newbury, Canonical Conventions, supra note 25, at 61.
139. See Olick & Robbins, supra note 128, at 128; see also THOMSON, WHISPERING,
supra note 76, at 53 (arguing the Kagame regime’s version of history is “strategically
revisionist”); Newbury, Canonical Conventions, supra note 25, at 67 (arguing much of
contemporary Rwandan history “does not seem to have resulted from analysis but from apparent
political objectives”).
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use of “deductive methods in which selective data are mobilized to
support predetermined conclusions.”140 History in Rwanda, he argues,
“is being expostulated without reference even to the most elemental
historical resources, or reference to alternative assessments . . . .”141
Certain elements of Rwanda’s new, official history are factual, but
those facts often are cherry picked: bits of history are taken out of
context and without nuance, then reassembled in ways that support the
regime’s claim to power. 142 Writing together, David and Catherine
Newbury drolly refer to this brand of history as “truncated
empiricism.”143
The following sections describe the Kagame regime’s self-serving
version of Rwanda’s history and show how it departs from the views
of independent historians.
B.

The History of Rwanda According to the Kagame Regime
1. Ethnicity and Political Power

According to the Kagame regime’s official version of history,
Rwanda was a peaceful, harmonious, unified state before the arrival of
European colonialists. 144 A Tutsi monarchy ruled, 145 mostly
benevolently, 146 relying on a network of regional chiefs and sub-

140. Newbury, Canonical Conventions, supra note 25, at 61.
141. Newbury, Canonical Conventions, supra note 25, at 67, 72 (arguing that Rwanda
should “make the study of history more historical”).
142. Lemarchand, supra note 132, at 65-67 (arguing the Rwandan government selects
various shards of history to construct a “convenient reality” that supports its legitimacy).
143. Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In, supra note 10, at 849.
144. NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 33; Sarah Warshauer Freedman, et. al., Teaching
History in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 297, 301; Susan
Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation: Participant Observations on Ingando, in REMAKING
RWANDA, supra note 7, at 332-33 [hereinafter Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation]
(arguing the RPF claims in pre-colonial Rwanda all people lived “in peaceful harmony and
work[ed] together for the good of the nation”) (quoting The National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission, The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development, Exit Strategies (2004)).
145. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 17 (arguing that the Kagame regime’s
official history begins with an already established Tutsi monarchy, glossing over the more
nuanced, complicated history of interaction among various groups).
146. See NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 42 (arguing the RPF teaches young people
that in pre-colonial Rwanda people were kind to one another and “the rich were keen to help the
poor”); THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 50 (arguing the regime claims conflict
between groups was rare in pre-colonial Rwanda).
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chiefs.147 The origins of this happy kingdom are vague, but they stretch
back into the mists of time.148
Importantly, the terms “Tutsi” and “Hutu” had different meanings
in those happier days. They existed as concepts, but they described
socio-economic classes, not distinct “tribes” or “ethnicities.”149 Wealth
was measured largely in cattle, and the minority Tutsi tended to be
comparatively wealthy pastoralists, while the majority Hutu tended to
be less well-off agriculturalists.150 But there was fluidity between the
socio-economic groups: if a Hutu man accumulated cattle and became
wealthier, he and his family would ascend to the category Tutsi. 151
Likewise, a Tutsi who lost his cattle and his wealth might descend to
the category of Hutu.152 (The Twa, forest dwellers whom historians
consider to be the area’s indigenous people, are for the most part left
out of the official narrative.)153 In sum, before colonial interference, the
people of Rwanda were unified. They spoke the same language,
worshiped the same gods, were economically interdependent, and were
loyal to the same benevolent leader.154 Conflict was rare, and when it
happened it was rooted in regional or clan identities, not ethnicity.155
2. Causes of the Genocide
The idea that Hutu and Tutsi people were separate “tribes” or
“ethnicities” was a pernicious invention devised by German and

147. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 58.
148. See id. at 56 (arguing the Kagame regime sometimes invokes the ancient origins of
the Nyiginya dynasty when in fact that history is better understood as lineages and clans
interacting and vying for power); Newbury, Understanding, supra note 14, at 85 (arguing that
the royal dynasty became dominant only in the last two hundred years and that to claim Rwanda
as a “single political unit that goes far back in time” runs contrary to the historical record).
149. THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 50; see Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic
Mass, supra note 31, at 313 (criticizing the RPF’s claims that ethnic identities in Rwanda are
“simply products of external machinations”).
150. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 50 (arguing Rwanda’s official history
maintains Tutsi and Hutu were based partly on occupations).
151. See id. (arguing the Kagame regime insists that the labels “Tutsi” and “Hutu” were
based on poverty and wealth, not blood, and that wealth could cause one to shift from Twa or
Hutu to Tutsi).
152. Id.
153. See id. at 17, 81 (arguing that an estimated 10,000 Twa were murdered during the
genocide but never included in the RPF’s official history).
154. Id. at 50.
155. Id.
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especially Belgian colonialists 156 to facilitate their domination and
exploitation of Rwanda’s territory and people. 157 The Belgians, in
collusion with the White Fathers from the Catholic Church, taught
Rwandans that Hutu and Tutsi were separate, competing tribes, and that
they should hate one another.158 Beginning in the 1930s, they reified
this tribal distinction by issuing national identity cards that declared
individuals’ race and made it permanent.159 They also perpetuated the
false notion that Hutu and Tutsi people were the products of separate
migrations, with the Tutsi people infiltrating from the region of the Nile
in comparatively recent times.160 During and after the Hutu Revolution
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, they indoctrinated a political Hutu
elite in their false, divisive history, encouraging them to hate and fear
the Tutsi.161
This hateful, false, foreign history caused violent political
competition between Hutus and Tutsis. It was used by Rwanda’s postindependence Hutu leaders to divide the country, suppress Tutsis, and
maintain their illegitimate rule. 162 Ultimately, it created a mindset
among Hutus that led inexorably to the 1994 genocide.163 Colonialists
had taught the Hutu to atavistically hate the Tutsi, making inevitable
the political violence that lasted from the 1950s through the early
1990s, and culminating in the events of 1994.164
3. Historical Narratives About the Genocide Itself
Once the genocide began, it was up the RPF and the RPF alone to
stop it.165 They militarily defeated the genocidal Hutu regime, racing

156. Id.
157. See NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 33; THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76,
at 64-65; Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 336.
158. See NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 33; THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76,
at 50; Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 336.
159. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 56-57.
160. THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 50, 55.
161. See NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 33 (arguing the post-colonial Hutu presidents,
Kayibanda and Habyarimana, continued to use ethnicity as a wedge to divide Rwanda and
maintain power).
162. See id. at 33; THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 50-51;
163. THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 51.
164. Id.
165. See Victor Peskin, Victor’s Justice Revisited: Rwandan Patriotic Front Crimes and
the Prosecutorial Endgame at the ICTR , in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 174 (arguing
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through the country (sometimes being compelled to face off with the
French) 166 to take possession of territory and stop the slaughter. 167
Although there may have been a few random revenge killings along the
way carried out by distraught RPF soldiers, Kagame and his troops
were scrupulous in abiding by the rules of warfare and avoiding civilian
casualties. 168 The RPF’s restraint and discipline was all the more
impressive given that all Hutus, not just representatives of the
government and military, were guilty of genocide.169 Concomitantly,
all victims and survivors were Tutsi.170
Not surprisingly, this version of pre-colonial, colonial, and postindependence history of Rwanda supports the Kagame regime’s claim
to legitimacy as well as its need to intervene aggressively to reeducate
the populace. If ethnicity is a mere colonial invention, as the
government claims, it should be ignored and abolished.171 The fact that
contemporary Rwanda is ruled almost entirely by an Anglophone Tutsi
elite is of no particular consequence,172 because the label “Tutsi” lacks
historical and political salience.173 The government’s arguably heavyhanded efforts to impose a Rwandan nationalism on its people174 are in
fact a return to a golden age before Europeans despoiled the country.175
The government’s historical narrative of the genocide similarly
bolsters its claim to legitimate rule.176 Kagame and his RPF troops had
Rwanda’s government has claimed the status of “rescuer” of Tutsi victims of the genocide and
likens calls for RPF prosecutions as genocide denial).
166. See generally supra note 50 and accompanying text.
167. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 84 (arguing the Rwandan government
invokes the RPF’s “heroic status” to justify its repressive rule).
168. See Peskin, supra note 165, at 175 (arguing the Rwandan government claims RPF
troops acted correctly with the exception of a few aggrieved individuals); see also Haskell &
Waldorf, supra note 74, at 53, 54-58 (arguing the government claims RPF crimes were isolated
revenge killings by a small number of rogue soldiers and blocks all attempts to investigate
further).
169 . Helen Hintjens, Reconstructing Political Identities in Rwanda, in A FTER
G ENOCIDE, supra note 27, at 77, 87; Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at
315.
170 . See Nigel Eltringham, The Past is Elsewhere: The Paradoxes of Proscribing
Ethnicity in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 269, 270; see also
THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 17 (arguing the government considers all Hutu to be
violent killers who need to be reeducated on what it means to be Rwandan).
171. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 294.
172. See generally supra note 123.
173. See generally supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
174. See generally infra Part IV.
175. Eltringham, supra note 170, at 270.
176. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 293.
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nothing to do with spurring the genocide, and once the killing began,
he and his collaborators sprang into action and saved not just his
people, but also his nation. This gives him and the RPF unquestioned
moral authority to lead the country out of violence and madness and
into a peaceful and prosperous future. Further, the fact that Rwanda’s
entire Hutu population was indoctrinated into the colonialists’ evil,
divisive, anti-nationalist worldview means that Kagame and his regime
are justified in taking extreme measures and exercising tight control as
they guide the population back toward the true path.
C. The History of Rwanda According to Historians
As the following discussion reveals, there is overlap between the
Rwandan government’s self-serving version of history and the version
that historians generally agree upon. However, the historians’ account
includes context and nuance and that does not necessarily support the
Kagame regime’s claim to political legitimacy.
1. Ethnicity and Political Power
It is true, as claimed by Rwanda’s government, that the terms
Hutu and Tutsi held different meanings in pre-colonial Rwanda than
they do today. It is false, however, to assert that those terms were
unconnected to ethnic distinctions and that Europeans invented ethnic
division in what today is Rwanda.
In fact, the meaning and political salience of ethnic identities in
Rwanda have varied according to the historical epoch and the specific
geographic, political, and social context. 177 In most of what now is
Rwanda, for most of its history, region, clan and kinship were more
important to peoples’ identity than the ethnic labels “Hutu” and
“Tutsi.”178 Two hundred or more years ago there were as many as fifty
different political units in the territory we now call Rwanda, some with
leaders we today would perceive as “Hutu,” some “Tutsi.” 179 They
viewed themselves as distinct from one another, but their distinction
sprang from their geographic location or their clan or lineage identities,
not their ethnicity.180
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 313.
Id.
Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 85.
Id. at 83-85.
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The economies of certain of these small kingdoms, mainly those
located in present-day Rwanda’s eastern grasslands, were based on
cattle herding.181 It became important for them to claim control over
their grasslands, thus they became more stratified and militarized over
time. 182 By the mid-1700s, one such grassland group, the Nyiginya
dynasty, began to assert broader control and to seek to centralize its
authority.183 Only then, as the emergent kingdom was asserting control
and coherence did the notion arise of membership in a group called
“Tutsi.” 184 As the royal Nyiginya dynasty expanded and came into
contact with others of different cultures, it reinforced its own identity
as “Tutsi.” 185 As this Tutsi identity coalesced, others continued to
construct their own identities through their lineages and locales.186 But
as the Tutsi kingdom expanded its reach and thrust ever more groups
into subservient political positions, 187 those subservient groups also
began to form a common identity; in this instance, as “Hutu.”188
It is also true, as the Rwandan government claims, that the
boundaries between the social and ethnic categories “Hutu” and
“Tutsi” were historically porous and that individuals sometimes
switched groups as a result of marriage or economic gain or loss.189 But
the historical record does not support the regime’s claims that those
categories were based merely on class distinction, that there was little
or no conflict, and that Hutus and Tutsis lived in a more or less
cooperative and symbiotic relationship where the wealthier and more
powerful (i.e., Tutsi) looked out for the economically less powerful
(Hutu).190

181. Id. at 85.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 86.
184. See id. at 85-86; see also Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at
313 (arguing that only with the emergence of the Nyiginya clan power structures did the label
“Tutsi” gain salience, initially only because it was used by outsiders to describe them).
185. Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 86.
186. See Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 313 (arguing that
political groups in what today is northwestern Rwanda did not identify as “Hutu” until quite
recently).
187. See Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 87 (arguing in this new
and evolving context, Tutsi culture came to be associated with upper class power and Hutu
culture with lower class labor).
188. Id. at 86.
189. Id. at 84.
190. See generally supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
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In fact, pre-colonial Rwanda was rife with political contestation
and conflict.191 The mutual dependence and symbiosis that the current
government ascribes to pre-colonial Rwanda was in reality a clientship
relationship in which mainly-Tutsi overlords exploited the labor of
their mainly-Hutu subjects. 192 These arrangements were “voluntary”
only in that the subjects were free to choose whether to lose their lives
or give up their labor.193
It is also historically false that the Europeans alone were
responsible for the stark social stratification that existed during the
colonial era. According to David Newbury, “[i]f external power altered
the ethnic landscape, ethnic awareness was not the work of colonialists
alone. The ruling classes were not passive onlookers; they willingly
participated in the extension of ethnic distinctions and in deepening the
meaning of such distinctions.”194 In other words, colonial power altered
ethnic conceptions and exacerbated rivalry and tension between
ethnicities, but it simply is not true that ethnicity was a colonial
fiction.195
To summarize, ethnic distinctions existed before the colonialists
arrived. The meaning of the terms Hutu and Tutsi evolved over time
and became more significant and more reified after the Tutsi Nyiginya
dynasty became the predominant political power in the 18th and 19th
centuries. That kingdom developed an economic system that permitted
elite, powerful Tutsi overlords to prosper from the labor of their mostly
Hutu subjects. When Europeans arrived, they took these pre-existing
ethnic categories and these pre-existing economic and social
relationships and twisted them for their own benefit.

191. See Newbury, Canonical Conventions, supra note 25, at 58-59 (arguing that violence
in Rwanda did not begin with colonial intervention); Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra
note 14, at 84.
192. See Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In, supra note 10, at 860
(arguing that so-called “cattle clientship” between wealthy and poor Rwandans was uncommon
and did not act as “social glue”).
193. See id; see also NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 34-35 (arguing that if society was
“harmonious” before the arrival of white colonialists, it was because everyone knew his or her
place within a highly structured, hierarchical, essentially feudal social structure).
194. Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 87.
195. See id. at 88; see also Freedman et. al., supra note 144, at 302 (arguing ethnic
categories already existed in pre-colonial times and were already being used to divide the
population).
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2. Causes of the Genocide
According to the RPF’s approved historical narrative, atavistic
ethnic division and hatred – introduced by the Belgians and later and
exploited by post-independence Hutu politicians – caused the 1994
genocide.196 According to historians, the causes of the genocide were
varied and complex.197
The genocide was not, as the RPF claims, the culmination of an
ongoing ethnic pogrom that had been slowly building since the
1950s. 198 Instead, Rwandan Hutu political leaders consciously
manipulated ethnic division as a way to mobilize their supporters and
maintain their positions of power and privilege. 199 The distinction
between these narratives is important, because historians’ version
means that there was nothing inevitable about the genocide. 200 For
generations, ethnicity had been an ongoing feature of Rwandan society
and politics, 201 “but it became politically meaningful as a result of
leaders’ responses to crisis, not as a cause of the crisis.”202
From the perspective of Hutu politicians in Rwanda, the 1980s
was, indeed, a time of crisis. The country was reeling politically and
economically and much of the population – including the Hutu
population – was unhappy with President Habyarimana’s rule. 203
World coffee prices had plummeted, sending the economy into a
tailspin. 204 Externally imposed structural adjustment programs, in
vogue after the fall of the Berlin Wall, exacerbated Rwandan’s
economic suffering. 205 The downturn led to famine in parts of the
country,206 as well as to a surfeit of unemployed, angry young men who

196. See generally supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
197. See Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In, supra note 10, at 875
(arguing the genocide was caused by a combination of growing class consciousness and
resentment of the rich, ecological factors, the role of churches and church leadership, rapid
changes in the economy including a precipitous fall in the commodity price of coffee, a famine
in southern Rwanda, and the abrupt withdrawal of the state from social services).
198. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 295.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 296.
201. See generally supra notes 177-88 and accompanying text.
202. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 295.
203. Id.
204. Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 89.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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were prevented from marrying by their lack of economic prospects.207
All of the resentment and social divisions that were festering during the
1980s – primarily divisions based on class and regional differences208
– might have been turned against the Habyarimana regime.209
Instead, when the RPF invaded northern Rwanda in 1990, 210
hardliners within the Hutu government succeeded in channeling
citizens’ frustration and anger toward what they claimed was the
common enemy: the RPF and their supposed Tutsi collaborators within
the country’s borders. 211 The Hutu hatemongers succeeded in
portraying Tutsis as the common enemy and convincing much of the
population that the RPF’s mission – in alliance with all Rwandan Tutsis
– was to reestablish the Tutsi monarchy that had lorded over Hutus for
generations.212 No historians – at least no credible historians – argue
that the RPF brought the genocide upon the Tutsi people by invading
Rwanda, but a nuanced, multi-causal explanation of events includes the
invasion’s catalyzing effect and Hutus’ collective memory of an
oppressive Tutsi dynasty.
3. Historical Narratives About the Genocide Itself
The Kagame regime maintains that all of Rwanda’s Hutus were
perpetrators of the genocide and that they all were motivated by ethnic
hatred.213 Concomitantly, all genocide victims were Tutsi,214 which is
why the Kagame regime now insists that the genocide be referred to
exclusively as “the genocide against the Tutsi.”215

207. Id. at 91.
208. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 300.
209. See id. at 315 (arguing one result of the 1990 RPF invasion was that Hutus who were
unhappy with the Habyarimana regime and might have joined a moderate political coalition
were instead convinced that Tutsis were the cause of their misfortune).
210. See generally supra Part II.
211. See Straus & Waldorf, supra note 8, at 8 (arguing the role the RPF’s 1990 invasion
of Rwanda played in exacerbating ethnic division and sparking the genocide).
212. See William F.S. Miles, The Nazi Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide, Round
Table, 5 J. OF G ENOCIDE R SCH. 131, 140 (2003) (a roundtable discussion quoting Catherine
and David Newbury as arguing that the RPF was associated in Rwandans’ minds with the
dynasty that had dominated Rwanda for several generations before the arrival of the Europeans);
see also supra Part IV.C.1.
213. See generally supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
214. See generally supra note 170 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Tashobya, infra note 260 (using the term “genocide against the Tutsi”).
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But scholars judge several aspects of the RPF’s genocide narrative
to be historically inaccurate. First, not all Hutus were killers. There are
many credible accounts of Hutus opposing the genocide, sometimes by
hiding and protecting those at risk.216
Second, the many who did participate in the genocide had
motivations far more complicated and varied than mere ethnic
hatred. 217 Studies have determined that killers were motivated by a
multiplicity factors including fear of retribution for not participating,
greed, and a cultural propensity to follow orders.218
Third, although it is undeniably true that the vast majority of
victims were Tutsi, many Hutu (and Twa) also died. As described in
Part II, the first victims were politically moderate opponents of the
Habaryamana regime, many of whom were Hutu.219 Also, many who
died were the product of generations of intermixing and intermarrying,
so it was not at all clear which ethnic pole they were associated with.220
The RPF’s historical narrative also departs in significant respects
from historians’ regarding its army’s conduct during and after the
genocide. As recounted in the previous section, the RPF’s version
depicts its army as blameless heroes.221 But while historians and other
academics praise the skill and courage of the RPF army in confronting
the genocide, 222 they also assert that the RPF’s excesses and crimes are
an essential part of the historical narrative.223 Although Rwandans are
not permitted to discuss or in any way acknowledge it, academics agree
overwhelmingly that in the run-up to the RPF’s 1994 military victory,
and in immediate aftermath, they killed an estimated 30,000 mostlyHutu civilians in Rwanda. 224 The Kagame regime consistently
216. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 295.
217. See id. (arguing people participated in the genocide for numerous reasons including
fear, greed, and a cultural propensity to follow orders).
218. Id.; see generally LEE ANN FUJII, K ILLING N EIGHBORS: WEBS OF V IOLENCE IN
R WANDA (2009) (arguing that genocide perpetrators’ motivations were varied and complex).
219. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 295.
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
222. See supra Part II.
223. See Haskell & Waldorf, The Impunity Gap, supra note 74, at 50 (arguing RPF crimes
are wrongly left out of the story); THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 97 (same).
224. Haskell & Waldorf, The Impunity Gap, supra note 74, at 51. The scope of the
unlawful killing has been verified by numerous credible sources. A team from the United
Nations High Commission for Refugees traveled through Rwanda in September of 1994 and
concluded that the RPF had murdered, massacred or caused the disappearance of as many as
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dismisses these incidents as random killings by emotionally
overwhelmed, ill-disciplined foot soldiers, 225 but the renowned
Rwanda expert, Allison Des Forges, and others, concluded that the
widespread killings were too similar, and the army far too well
disciplined,226 to explain them away as random acts of revenge.227
No one, at least no one credible, claims that the killings by the
RPF army, even though on a significant scale, were the moral
equivalent of the genocide perpetrated by the Hutu hardliners.228 Any
claim of a “double genocide” should be firmly rejected. 229 But in
Rwanda, no one is permitted to discuss the RPF atrocities and, with the
exception of a couple of minor show-trials, no one has been held to
account.230
4. Summarizing the Conflicting Historical Narratives
In short, Rwanda’s current government insists on a version of precolonial history characterized by a lack of ethnic difference,
harmonious, mutually beneficial economic relationships between
social classes, and wise political leadership provided by a beneficent
monarch. This version of history helps legitimize the Kagame regime
45,000 civilians including women, children, and the elderly. Id. at 52. The renowned Rwanda
expert, Alison Des Forges, investigated the issue for Human Rights Watch and came to a similar
conclusion. Id. A subsequent U.N.-appointed Commission of Experts found that RPF soldiers
had committed breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity. Id. at
51.
225. See id. at 53 (arguing that the government dismisses these incidents as mere “revenge
killings” and charges anyone who disagrees with “genocide denial”).
226. Peskin, supra note 164, at 174-5.
227. Haskell & Waldorf, The Impunity Gap, supra note 73, at 52; see Stearns & Borello,
Bad Karma, supra note 20, at 164 (arguing much of the killing of Hutu civilians in the Congo
happened after the RPF had taken control of the country and so cannot be explained as mere
“collateral damage”).
228. See Waldorf, Instrumentalixzing Genocide, supra note 69, at 50 (rejecting claims of
dual genocide and moral equivalency).
229. Id.
There are much more serious allegations lodged against the RPF of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and even genocide, based on its military interventions in Zaire/Democratic
Republic of Congo. See generally JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS:
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA (2011). An examination of
those conflicts is beyond the scope of this paper.
230. H UMAN R IGHTS WATCH, R WANDA : JUSTICE A FTER G ENOCIDE – 20 Y EARS O N
(2014); see Peskin, supra note 165, at 177-179 (discussing the RPF’s successful efforts to stage
show trials in Rwanda and prevent the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda from
investigating RPF crimes); Haskell & Waldorf, The Impunity Gap, supra note 74, at 51 (arguing
that the ruling RPF instructed participants in Rwanda’s gacaca courts, which adjudicated
genocide-related crimes, not to discuss any allegations against the RPF).

112

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:79

in several respects. It renders irrelevant the fact that contemporary
Rwanda is being run by a small group of elite Tutsi because “Tutsi”
(along with other ethnic signifiers), has no historical validity except as
a term used by colonialists to divide Rwanda’s people. In addition, this
version implies that it is historically appropriate – and essentially
Rwandan – for the nation to be guided politically by a wise and
benevolent autocrat: the king in pre-colonial days and Paul Kagame
today. Historians and other scholars generally agree on a more
complicated, dynamic, and nuanced version of pre-colonial history,
one that includes ethnic difference and struggle and, crucially,
economic exploitation by a powerful Tutsi monarchy.
Another vital – and self-serving – aspect of the government’s
approved historical narrative is that the 1994 genocide was caused by
atavistic ethnic hatred that the Belgian colonialists invented and
inculcated in Rwanda’s people. The fact that Rwandans’ minds were
polluted with hatred, and that the inevitable result was so catastrophic,
justifies the current regime’s efforts to reeducate its population (using
various heavy handed methods described in Part IV, below) about the
true nature of Rwananness. Historians, in contrast, believe that there
were multiple, complex causes of the genocide, including the fact that
elite Hutu politicians exploited longstanding ethnic divisions as a
means of redirecting Hutu citizens’ anger and frustration from the
government and toward the Tutsis who had recently invaded the
country’s north.
Finally, the current regime’s approved historical narrative depicts
the RPF and Paul Kagame as blameless heroes who singlehandedly
stopped the genocide. They halted the wanton killing by Rwanda’s
Hutu citizens, all who were genocidaire, and they saved the remaining
Tutsi citizens, all who were victims. Because the RPF and the RPF
alone restored peace to Rwanda, it has the right and the moral authority
to complete the country’s reconstruction.
While historians agree that the RPF was responsible for halting
the carnage, they insist that the RPF committed war crimes and crimes
against humanity during and after its successful military campaign.
They also emphasize that the genocide is not properly described as “the
genocide against the Tutsi,” as the government insists it be called,231
because although the vast majority of those killed were Tutsi, many
Hutu and Twa were also murdered.
231. See infra note 259.
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IV. ENFORCING THE KAGAME REGIME’S FANCIFUL VERSION
OF HISTORY
The following section describes the Rwandan government’s
multifaceted approach to inculcating and enforcing its versions of
history and collective memory. As the discussion will reveal, President
Kagame and his coterie employ the usual tools of repressive regimes:
banning unwanted speech, stifling the press, and coopting and
controlling civil society. But the government’s efforts also include
more sophisticated means of ensuring that only its preferred history is
remembered: controlling academic discourse, employing “reeducation
camps,” and exercising tight control over public memorialization.
A.

Laws Limiting Expression

Since taking control of Rwanda’s government, the RPF has used
restrictions on speech, particularly speech related to the 1994 genocide,
as a tool to squelch all unwanted expression. In recent years it has
honed these legal tools and intensified their use.
The first salvo was a 2001 law that proscribed acts of
discrimination and “sectarianism” by prohibiting “the use of any
speech, written statement or statement or action that divides people,
that is likely to spark conflict among people, or that causes an uprising
which might degenerate into strife among people based on
discrimination.”232 Although the law did not explicitly say so, it was
widely interpreted as criminalizing the use of the words “Hutu” and
“Tutsi” except as narrowly approved by the government.233
Rwanda’s 2003 Constitution committed the country to “fighting
the ideology of genocide in all its manifestations”234 and criminalized
“[r]evisionism, negationism, and trivialization of the genocide.”235 As
many commentators pointed out, this language was sweepingly broad
and disturbingly vague.236
232. Law No 47/2001 Instituting Punishment for the Offences of Discrimination and
Sectarianism, Official Gazette of Rwanda, Dec. 18, 2001.
233. Jansen, supra note 7, at 9.
During my visits to Rwanda I have observed that most people are reluctant to utter the
terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi,” even in private conversation.
234. CONSTITUTION May 26, 2003, art 9 (Rwanda).
235. Id., art. 13.
236. Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide, supra note 70, at 51 see Jansen, supra note 7,
at 11 (arguing that none of the key constitutional terms are defined).
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The 2003 Law Punishing Genocide attempted to clarify the
constitutional language quoted in the previous paragraph, declaring
that the proscriptions apply to “any person who will have publicly
shown, by his or her words, writings, images, or by any other means,
that he or she has negated the genocide, committed, rudely minimized
it or attempted to justify or approve its grounds . . . .” 237 Those
convicted under the 2003 law were subject to twenty years’
imprisonment.238 If any Rwandan prosecutors were squeamish about
punishing citizens based on such vaguely defined laws,239 they did not
show it.240 According to Human Rights Watch, in a single year between
mid-2007 and mid-2008, 243 people were charged with revisionism
and negation, often for merely diverging from the government’s
approved history of the genocide.241
In more recent years, the government’s favored legal method for
stifling unwanted expression has been to prosecute people –
particularly Hutu people – with the even more vaporous charge of
“genocide ideology.”242 (In contrast, Tutsi people who stray from fold
are usually charged with corruption.)243 Charges of genocide ideology
began emerging in 2003, even though neither the 2003 Constitution,
nor the 2003 Law Punishing Genocide mentioned the concept.244
In 2004, with many charges of genocide ideology already
pending, the government ordered a Senate commission to examine
genocide ideology’s causes and cures. 245 In 2006, that commission
issued its report and defined genocide ideology and revisionism in such
237. Law No. 33n bis/2003, Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes, art. 4., Official Gazette of Rwanda, Nov 1, 2003 [hereinafter 2003 Genocide
Law.]
238. Id., art 4.
239. See Jansen, supra note 7, at 13 (arguing the terms of the 2003 Genocide Law –
including “rudely minimize” – are extremely broad and pointing out that another section of the
law also punishes “incitement” to commit such a crime, which can be applied whether or not
any action follows the alleged incitement).
240. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 12-13 (arguing that the 2003 law was
used to punish anyone who claimed that anyone other than Tutsi had died in the genocide and
to anyone whom the government perceived as critical).
241. H UMAN R IGHTS WATCH, L AW AND R EALITY: P ROGRESS IN JUDICIAL R EFORM
IN R WANDA (July 2008), p. 40; Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide, supra note 70, at 52.
242. Allen & Norris, supra note 7, at 147.
243. Id.
244. See Jansen, supra note 7, at 4 (arguing that Rwanda’s government began charging
people with genocide ideology even before the law had been passed).
245. Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide, supra note 670, at 54.
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broad terms that practically any mention of ethnicity or any criticism
of the government falls within its ambit and may be punished.246 A
follow-on parliamentary commission investigating genocide ideology
uncovered evidence of the crime in twenty-six schools across the
country, resulting in the firing of dozens of teachers.247 In 2007, the
government began in earnest charging citizens with genocide ideology,
even though the appropriate legislation still did not exist.248
It was not until 2008 that the government got around to passing a
law defining and punishing genocide ideology. 249 According to that
law, genocide ideology may be found:
in any behavior manifested by facts aimed at dehumanizing a
person or a group of persons with the same characteristics in the
following manner: 1) Threatening, intimidating, degrading
through defamatory speeches, documents, or actions which aim at
propounding wickedness or inciting hatred; 2) Marginalizing,
laughing at one’s misfortune, defaming, mocking, boasting,
despising, degrading, creating confusion aimed at negating the
genocide which occurred, stirring up ill feelings, taking revenge,
altering testimony or evidence for the genocide which occurred; 3)
Killing, planning to kill, or attempting to kill someone for the
purposes of furthering genocide ideology.250

As critics have pointed out, this law on genocide ideology is not
only sweeping and vague, but is almost completely disconnected from
the crime of genocide. 251 It does not require proof that the accused
intended to assist or facilitate genocide or possess knowledge that
anyone else was planning genocide.252 To date, no one knows what
these terms mean, except that virtually anyone may be prosecuted for
saying anything the government disagrees with.253

246. Id.
247. Id.; see H UMAN R IGHTS WATCH, LAW AND R EALITY, supra note 241, at 38
(arguing a Rwandan government commission found “genocide ideology” in 26 of 32 schools it
investigated).
248. Allen & Norris, supra note 7, at 148.
249. Law No. 18/2008, Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology,
Official Gazette of Rwanda, October 15, 2008 [hereinafter 2008 Genocide Law].
250. Id., art. 3.
251. H UMAN R IGHTS WATCH, L AW AND R EALITY, supra note 241, at 42.
252. Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide, supra note 70, at 56.
253. Jansen, supra note 7, at 5.
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Prison terms under the 2008 law range up to fifty years.254 An
offense that involves “documents, speeches, pictures, media or any
other means” – meaning, in effect, any genocide ideology
communicated by any media or any politician – are punished by a
minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment. 255 Children under the age of
twelve can be held criminally responsible, and the children’s parents
and teachers can also be prosecuted.256 Finally, the law makes clear that
nongovernmental organizations may be charged, and that convictions
can lead to dissolution, fines, and individual prosecutions.257
The government has made clear its intention to use its entire
bureaucratic infrastructure, right down to the village level, to root out
genocide ideology.258 Rwandan newspapers, all of which are controlled
by the government,259 are replete with accounts of successful genocide
ideology prosecutions and exhortations for citizens to be ever vigilant
and report their suspicions of genocide ideology to government
officials.260
As was true of the 2003 Genocide Law, prosecutors have pursued
offenders with alacrity. According to a report by Amnesty
International, in the two years after the passage of the 2008 Genocide
Law, hundreds of people were prosecuted for genocide ideology or
genocide revisionism.261 Many of these prosecutions, particularly since

254. 2008 Genocide Law, arts. 4, 8.
255. Id., art. 8.
256. Id., art. 11.
257. Id., art. 7; see infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the government’s control of civil society).
258. Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide, supra note 70, at 57.
259. See infra Part IV.B.1.
260 . See, e.g., Athan Tashobya, Kwibuka 2015 Registered Highest Ever Cases of
(July
11,
2015),
http://www.newtimes.co.
Genocide
Denial,
NEW TIMES
rw/section/article/2015-07-11/190503/ [https://perma.cc/3Q7R-CJF2] (archived Oct. 26, 2017)
(reporting and lauding a record number of genocide denial and revisionism charges lodged
during annual genocide commemorations, from 86 in the previous year to 168 in the current
year); see also Nyamagabe Man Arrested Over Genocide Ideology, NEW TIMES (June 30, 2015),
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-06-30/190192/
[https://perma.cc/5TBPBQJX] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (reporting the arrest on charges of genocide ideology of a man
who “uttered statements that undermine the [genocide] commemoration” and reporting that
“[t]he Rwanda National Police has called on the public to remain vigilant and report any case of
genocide ideology, denial or negation that may arise in their communities.”).
261. A MNESTY I NTERNATIONAL, S AFER TO STAY S ILENT, THE C HILLING EFFECT OF
R WANDA’S LAWS ON ‘G ENOCIDE I DEOLOGY’ AND ‘SECTARIANISM’ 19 (2010); Jansen,
supra note 7, at 4 (arguing one defendant was a radio presenter who was charged with genocide
ideology for misspeaking while reading the news).
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the run up to the 2010 election, were targeted at the government’s
political opponents.262
In more recent years, the government has continued to tinker with
its genocide laws but the revisions have shed little light on the meaning
of the key terms and citizens continue to face prosecution for utterances
that have nothing to do with genocide other than that they diverge from
the regime’s preferred narrative.263 An update of the 2008 genocide law
purportedly clarifies the crime of “negation” by adding that predicate
acts must be public and deliberate.264 But “public acts” is defined as
any act in “a place accessible” by two or more people, and “deliberate”
is left undefined, which means little if anything has changed.265
In effect, the government uses the genocide ideology laws to
target, punish, and silence anyone who diverges from the RPF’s
carefully constructed, self-justifying narrative. 266 This includes
prosecution and punishment for anyone who dares refer to ethnicity in
public,267 in keeping with the RPF’s contention that ethnic difference
was a pernicious colonial invention.268 The laws are also consistently
invoked to pursue anyone who in any way criticizes the regime or its
policies.269 After all, if the Kagame regime is, as it claims, the only a
bulwark against the resumption of genocide, then any thoughts or
words that oppose the regime can be assumed to promote genocide.
B.

Laws and Extralegal Means for Controlling Media, Civil Society,
and Academic Inquiry

As revealed by the preceding discussion, the Rwandan
government restricts unwanted expression by everyone within the
country; however, it focuses particular attention on those who might
authoritatively contradict its self-justifying historical narrative: the
262. See Jansen, supra note 7, at 19 (arguing that an opposition candidate for president,
Agnes Uwimana-Nkusi, was prosecuted and jailed for saying that ethnic divisions led people to
“kill each other,” which is not a government approved version of the genocide); Id. at 19
(similar).
263. See generally, Jansen supra note 7, at 51-57.
264. Law No. 84/2013, Law on the Crime of Genocide Ideology and Other Related
Offenses, Official Gazette of Rwanda, Sept. 9, 2013.
265. Id.
266. See Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide, supra note 70, at 49-56.
267. Lemarchand, supra note 132, at 65.
268. See supra Part III.B.1.
269. Lemarchand, supra note 132, at 65.
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press, civil society, and scholars. Partly by invoking the vague genocide
denial laws described in the previous section, partly by applying other
laws that restrict who is eligible to enter the field, and partly through
extralegal bullying and intimidation, 270 the government strictly
enforces its version of events.271
1. Control of Media
Take for example Rwanda’s media. Until recently, any person or
persons aspiring to open a media outlet had to demonstrate to the
government, among other things, that they were in good standing in
their home communities and that they had the financial resources in
place to sustain the new venture.272 The government employed these
seemingly innocuous bureaucratic strictures to control who may enter
into public discourse through media.273
The government also uses extralegal means to prevent the media
from spreading ideas of which it disapproves. Anjan Sundaram’s
recently published book, Bad News: Last Journalists in a Dictatorship,
claims the RPF tightly controls all of Rwanda’s newspapers 274 and
places strict limits on what journalists are permitted to say. 275 To
270. See Chris Huggins, Shades of Grey: Post-Conflict Land Policy Reform in the Great
Lakes Region, in THE STRUGGLE OVER LAND IN AFRICA: CONFLICTS, POLITICS & CHANGE 39
(Ward Anseeuw & Chris Alden, eds.) (2010) (arguing The RPF has used cooptation, infiltration,
and intimidation to control critical voices and has used legal action against the crime of
“divisionism” to undermine the emergence of any credible opposition); see generally,
A MNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAFER TO S TAY SILENT, supra note 261, at 26-29 (describing
the government’s persistent efforts to “chill” the media and civil society).
271. See Longman, supra note 79, at 35-37 (arguing the RPF uses vague laws and threats
to stifle Rwanda’s press).
272. ANJAN SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS: LAST JOURNALISTS IN A DICTATORSHIP 37 (2016)
[hereinafter SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS].
273. Id. at 29.
274. See id. at 176 (arguing that the government stifles the Rwandan press while claiming
to have an open and vibrant media); see Freedom House, 2014 Rwanda Report,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/04/09/fh-freepress_2014_rwanda.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B2M-J66F] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing the
Rwandan government controls all aspects of the media despite reforms announced in 2013);
Human Rights Watch, Rwanda 2014, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/countrychapters/rwanda [https://perma.cc/RL4K-F75S] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing that in spite
of recent reforms Rwanda’s government forces its views on print media and intimidates and
threatens journalists who stray from approved stories); Donova, supra note 141 (arguing the
Rwandan press is “run by the government”).
275. See SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS, supra note 272, at 1-2 (describing an instance where
the government prevented journalists from reporting on a grenade explosion in Kigali).
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maintain the appearance of a vibrant press, the government cultivates
its own cadre of fawning journalists, referred to by the Kinyarwanda
term Intore, who happily restrict their reporting to governmentapproved topics and who consistently pose softball questions to
President Kagame and other government officials. 276 Until recent
years, foreign-funded media programs provided some independent
voice within Rwanda, and were sometimes willing to critique the
regime’s excesses, but those programs have been “shut down or
become toothless under government pressure.”277
Under international pressure to ease restrictions on the media, the
government took tentative steps in that direction starting in 2013.278
Among other things, it created a purportedly independent body to vet
and, if deemed necessary, discipline media outlets. 279 But all
indications are that these reforms are window dressing and that the
government continues to discipline journalists who stray from
approved themes by, among other things, acknowledging that Hutus
died during the genocide or alluding to ethnicity or discrimination in
contemporary Rwanda.280
When all else fails, the government resorts to violence to prevent
media diffusion of information that strays from its approved narrative.
Critics and human rights organizations have chronicled many instances
in which journalists have been beaten, arrested, disappeared, or killed
when they contradicted or critiqued the government. 281 As
276. Id. at 7-8.
277. Sundaram, Darling Tyrant, supra note 118, at ¶ 6.
278. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RWANDA COUNTRY SUMMARY 2016 2 (2016).
279. Id.
280. See generally Anton Harbor, The Committee to Protect Journalists, Legacy of Rwanda
Genocide Includes Media Restrictions, Self-Censorship (2014), https://cpj.org/reports/2014/12/
legacy-of-rwanda-genocide-includes-media-restricti.php [https://perma.cc/FSN3-7UE7] (last
visited Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing that in spite of some recent loosening, Rwandan media laws still
threaten imprisonment for insulting “by words, gestures, threats, writings or drawings” the
President, any government official, the police or ordinary citizens, and that journalists still must
constantly calculate the “unstated, vague, and arbitrary” limits on what they can say).To take
one recent example, in 2014, Stanley Gatera, editor of a privately owned newspaper, was
arrested on charges of corruption. The government alleged he tried to extract a bribe from a
tavern owner by threatening to write an article about the tavern owner’s failure to observe the
20-year anniversary of the genocide. He claimed the arrest was in retaliation for speaking to
international news sources about limits on freedom of expression in Rwanda. Id.
281. SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS, supra note 272, at 3-4, 181-192 (providing personal
anecdotes and an annex listing dozens of Rwandan journalists who have been beaten,
imprisoned, killed or have fled into exile); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2015:
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commentators have remarked, it does not require many beatings or
killings before would-be independent voices within the media learn
their lesson and begin to engage in strict self-censorship.282
2. Control of Civil Society
The story is similar for Rwanda’s civil society sector. 283 The
regime has suppressed, intimidated, or coopted organizations that
might otherwise object to its official narrative.284 For example, in 2001,
the government enacted legislation empowering itself to keep tabs on
the management, finances, projects and outcomes of domestic and
international NGOs that operate within the country. 285 It uses these
laws to control which civil society organizations exist and what they
say.286 It often requires the organizations – particularly human rights
organizations – to accept leadership that it has chosen.287 Those leaders
then steer the organizations toward outcomes that the regime
determines.288 It is also widely known that the government spies on and
monitors the communication of civil society organizations, including
international NGOs, and intervenes if it does not like what it hears.289
RWANDA, supra note 5 (arguing Rwanda’s government continues to intimidate and threaten
members of the press); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2011: RWANDA (2011)
(arguing the Rwandan government was responsible for killing and arresting journalists).
Sundaram, Darling Tyrant, supra note 117 (arguing that Kagame has been responsible for
assassinating, imprisoning, sending into exile, or torturing of more than a dozen political
dissidents and in recent years many well-known journalists, investigators, and political
opponents have been “found dead in mysterious circumstances”).
282. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 113.
283. See H UMAN R IGHTS W ATCH, RWANDA COUNTRY SUMMARY, supra note 278, at
1-2; see id. at 13 (arguing the RFP “strictly controls civil society organizations and other forms
of associational life, including churches and mosques”).
284. Longman, supra note 79, at 27-28; see A MNESTY I NTERNATIONAL, SAFER TO
STAY SILENT, supra note 261, at 26-28 (describing the Rwandan government’s efforts to coopt
and silence human rights organizations).
285 . Paul Gready, Beyond “You’re with Us or against Us”: Civil Society and
Policymaking in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 89.
286. Id. at 89-90.
287. Longman, supra note 79, at 27-28.
288. See id. at 275 (arguing the RPF has turned the civil society sector “corporatist,”
meaning NGOs receive and implement orders from the government); see Gready, supra note
285, at 90 (arguing the RPF has “thoroughly infiltrated the NGO sector in Rwanda and also has
created “umbrella organizations” to keep tabs on NGOs activities).
289. See Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 124 (arguing there
is a dense network of government spies throughout Rwanda); SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS, supra
note 172, at 159 (describing a journalist’s discovery that a friend and colleague was spying on
him for the Rwandan government); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2015: RWANDA

2017]

MANIPULATING MEMORY IN RWANDA

121

Where bureaucratic control and cooptation have been ineffective,
the government brings violence and the threat of violence to bear.290
As is true of journalists, it does not require many acts of violence before
civil society leaders receive the message and begin to engage in strict
self-censorship.291
In its efforts to restrict the press and civil society sector, the RPF
has not limited itself to domestic organizations. Recently, it attacked
the BBC, and barred it from broadcasting in Rwanda in Kinyarwanda
after a documentary film repeated allegations concerning the RPF’s
involvement in human rights violations during and after the
genocide.292 Similarly, it accused international NGOs such as Human
Rights Watch and CARE International of genocide ideology when they
questioned aspects of the regime’s preferred historical narrative.293
(2015) (arguing that the Rwandan government subjects NGOs to infiltration and intimidation).
During a six-week stay in Rwanda during the summer of 2015, I had a tense and difficult
exchange with Rwandan immigration officials. When I mentioned my experience to a European
acquaintance who has worked for an international NGO in Rwanda for many years, he remarked
that the government probably did not like what I was writing in my emails. When he saw my
puzzled expression, he said he was surprised that I did not know that the government routinely
monitors foreigners’ communications. He recounted two recent instances in which European
NGO employees whom he knew had been spirited out of the country by their embassies after it
became known that the Rwandan government was going to arrest them for objectionable
communications in their private emails. He added that it was common knowledge in the NGO
community that the Rwandan government plants spies to keep tabs on foreigners’ work. He
casually mentioned that he and his co-workers knew that at least one Rwandan employee was
reporting their activities to the government.
290. See Longman, supra note 79, at 30 (arguing the regime has assassinated or caused to
disappear numerous civil society activists).
291. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 124.
292. See Dugald Baird, BBC Should Face Criminal Action Over Rwanda Documentary,
Says Inquiry, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/mar
/02/bbc-rwanda-documentary-inquiry [https://perma.cc/5XYC-6E7F] (archived Nov. 6, 2017)
(describing the government’s concerted attack – including charges of minimizing and denying
the genocide – on the BBC for airing a documentary that questioned several tenets of Rwanda’s
approved genocide history, including the claim that few Hutus were killed and repeating the
claim that Kagame was responsible for the downing of the plane); see also Dugald Baird,
Rwanda Places Indefinite Ban on BBC Broadcasts Over Genocide Documentary, THE
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jun/01/rwanda-placesindefinite-ban-on-bbc-broadcasts-over-genocide-documentary [https://perma.cc/23KV-TSZ5]
(archived Oct. 26, 2017)(describing the “unanimous” decision by a Rwandan regulatory board
to place an indefinite ban on the BBC’s Kinyarwanda programming).
293. Straus & Waldorf, supra note 8, at 12-13. See Michele D. Wagner, All the
Bourgmestre’s Men: Making Sense of Genocide in Rwanda, 45 AFR. TODAY 25, 26 (1998)
(arguing the author, who eventually became a human rights investigator for Human Rights
Watch, was labeled a “genocide accomplice” for criticizing RPF retaliation killings).
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3. Control of Academic Inquiry
The Kagame regime carefully monitors and restricts what scholars
say about the country. As is true of the media and civil society sectors,
the RPF creates its own, sympathetic version of academic inquiry,
maintaining a stable of scholars who produce “research” that supports
the government’s historical narrative and legitimacy.294 Relatedly, the
government requires all incoming university students to attend
reeducation camps so that they can be thoroughly indoctrinated before
their studies begin.295
The government also aggressively restricts academic inquiry that
might contradict its version of events.296 Susan Thomson, a Canadian
political scientist and lawyer who now teaches at Colgate University in
the United States, has chronicled the RPF’s tight monitoring and
control of her doctoral fieldwork in Rwanda. 297 When her findings
strayed from government-approved themes, her government-assigned
minders presented her the choice of abandoning her research or
attending an RPF-controlled reeducation camp.298 She chose the camp,
a Kafkaesque experience that she later described in a harrowing book
chapter.299
294. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 22, 118 (arguing the government
trains a cadre of Rwandan academics, many employed by the National Commission for the Fight
Against Genocide (CNLG), to disseminate the approved version of history and attack anyone
who diverges); see also Newbury, Canonical Convention, supra note 25, at 67-72 (arguing the
government requires historians to restrict themselves to politically approved narratives and the
manipulation is “received uncritically” by the academic community within Rwanda).
295. See infra Part IV.C.
296. Hintjens, supra note 169, at 88-89; see Freedman, et. al., supra note 144, at 297-308
(describing the RPF shutting down an NGO-sponsored program on teaching Rwandan history
when the history teachers strayed from the RPF-approved script).
297. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 34-42 (arguing the RPF placed tight
restrictions on her field research and both covertly and overtly monitored her work).
298. See id.
299. Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 331-32. Not everyone
agrees that Rwanda punishes foreign academics who criticize it. Many American and European
academics claim that the regime monitors scholars and excludes them from the country if it
dislikes their findings. See Danielle de Lame, et. al, Truly Hostile Environment, INYENYERI
N EWS (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.inyenyerinews.org/human-rights/truly-hostile-environment/
[https://perma.cc/HJ2E-PEA3] (archived Nov. 6, 2017) (an open letter signed by eleven
prominent US and European scholars arguing that Rwanda monitors foreign researchers and
excludes those with which it disagrees); but see Phil Clark, Must Academics Researching
Authoritarian Regimes Self-Censor?, TIMES H IGHER EDUC., (Nov. 28, 2013),
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/must-academics-researching-authoritarianregimes-self-censor/2009275.article [https://perma.cc/RR2A-BW9L] (archived Nov. 6, 2017)
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C. Using Reeducation Camps to Teach the Government’s Version of
History
In 1995, shortly after the genocide, the RPF halted the teaching of
history in Rwanda’s schools, arguing that the pre-genocide history
curriculum had portrayed Tutsis inaccurately and negatively and had
contributed to the slaughter. 300 However, as described in earlier
sections of this paper, the RPF believes it to be vitally important to
implant a new version of history that legitimized its own rule. 301 It
therefore, in effect, transferred the task of teaching history to
institutions that it could more tightly control; namely the statecontrolled media302 and government-run indoctrination camps.303
There are two general categories of such camps. Solidarity camps,
or ingando, are primarily for politicians, civil society and church
leaders, judges, and incoming university students. 304 Reeducation
camps, or itorero are for ex-combatants, ex-soldiers, confessed
genocidaires, released prisoners, prostitutes, street children and other
undesirables.305 The camps are organized by Rwanda’s National Unity
and Reconciliation Commission (“NURC”) and its sub-body, the
Program in Civic Education and Conflict Management and Peace
Building, all staffed by Anglophone returnees.306 Camp sessions last
anywhere from several days to several weeks, 307 and they tend to
include a large military presence.308
The camps’ curriculum focuses on reeducating the population
about the ethnic unity and peace that existed before colonialism, a time
when Tutsi and Hutu lived “in peaceful harmony and worked together

(arguing that some academics exaggerate their peril for self-serving reasons and that the
Rwandan government generally permits critical scholarship so long as researchers follow proper
channels).
300. See Hilker, supra note 137, at 317.
301. See supra Part III.B.
302. See supra Part IV.B.1.
303. Schuberth, supra note 133, at 78, 83; THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 75, at 51
(arguing the government devotes huge resources to teaching its version of history through
mandatory solidarity camps (ingando) that aim to reeducate the population).
304. Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 333-334.
305. Id; see Straus & Waldorf, supra note 8, at 8-9 (arguing there are two kinds of
education camps in Rwanda).
306. THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 120.
307. Id. at 51, 120.
308. Id. at 120; SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS, supra note 272, at 23.
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for the good of the nation.”309 A key part of that narrative is that all
Tutsi are victims or survivors, whether they were in the country or not
at the time of the genocide, and that all Hutu are perpetrators, whether
or not they participated in the genocide.310Among non-RPF scholars
who have studied the camps, there is broad consensus that their goal is
to control public discourse and bolster the RPF’s claim to power, not
to achieve unity and reconciliation.311
D. Diffusing the Kagame Regime’s Version of History by Tightly
Controlling Public Remembrance
Tourists who visit Rwanda frequently visit the country’s grizzly
genocide memorials.312All of those I have seen include rooms – often
inside of churches where massacres took place – displaying heaps of
the victims’ tattered, bloody clothing, or stains on walls where
children’s brains were smashed. They also feature the stacked bones of
thousands, sometimes tens of thousands, of victims who were
murdered nearby. At one particularly macabre site, the Murambi
Memorial located near Butare in southern Rwanda, as many as 45,000
victims were slaughtered. 313 When the RPF took control and later
turned the site into a memorial, it filled the compound’s numerous
outbuildings with complete human remains preserved in lime. 314
Today, as tourists file through, they can see the horror on the victims’
faces and smell the lingering scent of human putrefaction.315
As with much else that happens in Rwanda today, the Kagame
regime carefully controls these memorials, and all other public forms

309. Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 333 (quoting The
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development,
Exit Strategies (2004)); see supra Part III.B (describing the RPF’s preferred historical narrative).
310. Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 333.
311. See id. at 332, 337.
312. See Mona Friedrich & Tony Johnston, Beauty Versus Tragedy: Thanatourism and
the Memorialization of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, J. of Tourism & Cultural Change 302, 303
(2013) (arguing Rwanda caters to “grief tourism”); Jens Meierhenrich, supra note 21, at 288
(arguing that the Nyamata Memorial, which includes stacks of bleached bones of genocide
victims, is a “popular stop for visitors”).
313. Murambi Genocide Memorial Centre, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Murambi_Genocide_Memorial_Centre (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
314. Id. (showing photographs of bleached corpses on display at the memorial).
315. I base this description on my own experience visiting Murambi during the summers
of 2013 and 2015.
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of remembrance, 316 to ensure that its historical narrative is
paramount. 317 The message is one of emotion, not reason. 318 When
one’s mind is swimming at the horror of smashed, stacked, human
remains – all caused, at least proximately, by the previous regime – it
is hard to be critical of the RPF.319 The loud and clear message is “see
what might happen if you question our methods?” 320 Or, more
pointedly, “given the horror that you are witnessing, is it not
understandable that we rule with a heavy hand?” 321 As much as
memorializing the past, these public sites are designed to compel
visitors to forget about the authoritarian present.322 To the international
community, rightly shamed for its inaction in 1994,323 the message is
“how dare you criticize our human rights record when you stood by and
allowed this to happen?”324
It bears mentioning that the regime’s chosen mode of
memorialization – the display of unburied, indistinguishable remains –
is starkly out of step with Rwandan custom.325 Rwandans prefer to bury
their dead near their homes as a way of maintaining contact with
ancestors.326 Traditionally, the display of human remains was thought
316. THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 7, 153-154 (arguing the government
requires citizens to participate in various state-sanctioned and led initiatives to commemorate
the genocide and celebrate national unity and reconciliation); Lisa M. Moore, (Re)Covering the
Past, Remembering Trauma: The Politics of Commemoration at Sites of Atrocity, 20 J. OF PUB.
& INT’ L A FF. 47, 54-56 (2009) (similar).
317. See Meierhenrich, supra note 21, at 288, 292 (arguing that memorials in Rwanda
“service privileged memory; that is, memory that is officially sanctioned because it is in
accordance with the post-genocide raison d’état”, and that private non-sanctioned memorials are
left to wither); Friedrich & Johnston, supra note 312, at 313-314 (arguing the memorials aim to
establish a clear narrative approved by the government, one which entirely excludes the memory
of Hutu suffering and blames the genocide on colonists’ machinations).
318. Meierhenrich, supra note 21, at 288.
319. Id. at 289.
320. See Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 333 (arguing the
memorial sites are meant to show the end result of ethnic division).
321 . See SCOTT S TRAUS, R EMAKING R WANDA : S TATE B UILDING AND H UMAN
R IGHTS A FTER MASS V IOLENCE 292 (2011) (arguing the memorials “justify a repressive
government by presenting a specter of past violence as a permanent future possibility”).
322. Id. at 307; Meierhenrich, supra note 21 at 289; see Rachel Ibreck, The Politics of
Mourning: Survivor Contributions to Memorials in Post-Genocide Rwanda, Memory Studies
330-331 (2010) (arguing the RPF uses genocide memorials to construct political legitimacy,
partly by “Tutsification of the genocide”).
323. See supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
324. Ibreck, supra note 322, at 172; Moore, supra note 316, at 55.
325. Meierhenrich, supra note 21, at 289; STRAUS, supra note 321, at 290.
326. Meierhenrich, supra note 21, at 290.
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to conjure a deceased’s spirit, which could cause danger in the temporal
world. 327 However, as culturally offensive as it may be to most
Rwandans to stack human remains in memorials, it has been
enormously successful as a strategy for marketing the genocide and
controlling its historical narrative.328
E.

Other Means of Controlling History and Memory

Some critics allege that other government policies, which at first
blush might seem removed from the realm of collective memory and
history, are in fact at least partially designed to limit public discourse
to approved themes. Each of these government programs is worthy of
independent exploration, but they receive only passing mention here.
First, some allege that Rwanda’s gacaca courts were motivated in
part by the regime’s desire to mold public memory concerning the
genocide. 329 The gacaca courts, which have generated a bountiful
scholarly literature that is well beyond the scope of this article, were
advertised as a quasi-traditional, community based system of justice
that the Kagame regime revived and adapted as a way of clearing the
enormous backlog of Rwandan citizens (all Hutu, according to the
RPF) rotting in jail after being accused of participating in the
genocide. 330 Some commentators praised gacaca as a reasonable
response to an overwhelming challenge: a necessary if imperfect step
on the path toward justice and reconciliation. 331 Others harshly
criticized gacaca courts as lacking due process and enabling score
settling at local levels. 332 And some pointed out that, although the
gacaca courts were ostensibly community-based and community-run,
in fact RPF central authorities tightly controlled their procedures and
their outcomes so that they explored only regime-approved issues and

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id.
Id. at 289.
Straus & Waldorf, supra note 8, at 9; NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 59.
Straus & Waldorf, supra note 8, at 9.
See Don Webster, The Uneasy Relationship Between the ICTR and Gacaca, in
R EMAKING R WANDA, supra note 6, at 187 (arguing that, at first, gacaca made sense as an
expedient way to deal with the backlog of genocide accusations); HUMAN R IGHTS WATCH,
R WANDA EVENTS OF 2009 (2010), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/countrychapters/rwanda [https://perma.cc/F7QF-AYBR] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (“some Rwandans
feel the gacaca process has helped reconciliation”).
332. H UMAN R IGHTS WATCH, R WANDA EVENTS OF 2009, supra note 331.
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established only regime-approved history.333 To take one example, the
government placed few limits on the gacaca courts’ ability to pursue
alleged Hutu perpetrators, but it strictly forbade any discussion of
alleged Tutsi violence.334
Similarly, commentators claim that Rwanda’s ambitious
programs of political decentralization and “villagization” are in fact
thinly veiled mechanisms for controlling social – including historical –
discourse down to the sub-village level. In recent years, Rwanda has
redrawn its political boundaries, ostensibly with the purpose of
devolving government to the grass roots and making local political
leaders responsive to their communities.335 In fact, according to critics,
the political reorganization has been used to extend the tentacles of the
RPF-controlled central government down to the lowest levels of
Rwandan society.336 This in turn has permitted the government to better
control all public, and even private, discourse affecting public memory
and history.337
Closely tied to political reorganization is the Kagame regime’s
program of “villagization,” or imidugudu, 338 which compels 339 rural
Rwandans, most of whom are subsistence farmers who traditionally
live in scattered family compounds,340 to move into centrally planned
villages. In the face of sustained criticism from the international donor

333. NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 59.
334. Id. at 59-60.
335 . Bert Ingelaere, The Ruler’s Drum and the People’s Shout: Accountability and
Representation on Rwanda’s Hills, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 68.
336. Id; THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 15-19; see SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS,
supra note 272, at 56 (arguing the RPF has used political reorganization as means to replace
local leaders with people loyal to the military, so now the military exercises tight control down
to the grassroots); see also Huggins, supra note 270, at 39 (arguing ostensible efforts to involve
local stakeholders are in fact “sensitization” meetings to publicize decisions that have already
been made by the central government).
337. THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 19, 22.
338. See Ingelaere, supra note 335, at 69 (arguing political decentralization happened in
tandem with “villagization”).
339. See Bruce, supra note 10, at 130 (arguing the government claimed no one would be
compelled to move into villages but in fact villagization was compulsory); Newbury, High
Modernism, supra note 9, at 224, 234 (arguing villagization is based on top-down authority and
involves substantial coercion).
340. Newbury, High Modernism, supra note 10, at 224; Ann-Sofie Isaksson, Manipulating
the Rural Landscape: Villagization and Income Generation in Rwanda, Working Papers in
Economics, no. 510, University of Gothenburg 1, 4 (June 2011).
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community, 341 and in spite of the disastrous history in Africa and
elsewhere of forced land relocation schemes, 342 the RPF has forged
forward, insisting that “villagization” was a vital element of its plans
to make Rwanda more economically efficient. 343 Critics, however,
claim that at least one purpose of “villagization” is to bring citizens into
a collective space so that central authorities can more easily monitor
what they say and do.344
F.

Summary of the Kagame Regime’s Methods and Description of
the Results

The Kagame regime in Rwanda has constructed a comprehensive
legal and extralegal scaffolding that enables it to control public
discourse and ensure that only its approved, self-justifying version of
collective memory endures. It aggressively pursues and punishes all
who express “genocide ideology” and defines that and similar crimes
so loosely that it is free to silence anyone who dissents from the official
narrative. It uses legal and extralegal means to control the media, civil
society, and scholarly inquiry. It has removed the teaching of history
from schools and transferred that function to government-controlled
indoctrination camps and government-controlled media. It exercises
tight control over public remembrance of the 1994 genocide and insists
341. See Bruce, supra note 10, at 130-131 (arguing NGOs began opposing villagization in
1998, soon after it began); Isaksson, supra note 340, at 5 (arguing Rwanda’s government
remains committed to the program in spite of the withdrawal of external support).
342. Newbury, High Modernism, supra note 10, at 224; see Isaksson, supra note 340, at 1
(arguing that previous villagization schemes, including in Tanzania and Ethiopia, negatively
impacted agricultural productivity).
343. Bruce, supra note 10, at 130; Isaksson, supra note 340, at 1, 5; Geoffrey Payne, Land
Issues in The Rwanda’s Post Conflict Law Reform, in LOCAL CASE STUDIES IN AFRICAN LAND
LAW 29 (Robert Home, ed. 2011).
344. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 121 (arguing the RPF uses the lowest
levels of the state administrative structure, including imidugudu (villages), to monitor the
individual and group activities of all Rwandans and control dissent). Some commentators even
condemn Rwanda’s “clean up” initiatives as part of its comprehensive effort to impose the
regime’s preferred narrative. Rwanda – its capital city in particular – is startlingly clean and
orderly compared to most African cities. Critics claim, however, that the government creates
this order by routinely arresting and indefinitely detaining street people and other
“undesirables,” essentially warehousing them in so-called “transit centers,” lest they contradict
the regime’s narrative about easing poverty in post-genocide Rwanda. Rwanda: Locking Up
the Poor: New Findings of Arbitrary Detention, Ill-Treatment in “Transit Centers,”
H UMAN R IGHTS WATCH (July 21, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/21/rwandalocking-poor [https://perma.cc/QGC5-4XDW] (archived Nov. 9, 2017).
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upon grizzly, culturally inappropriate memorials that emphasize the
horror that might ensue if anyone questions its authority. Finally, it has
compelled its citizens to uproot their lives and move into newly formed
villages, and has devolved its own power down to the sub-village level,
arguably to enhance its ability to control public discourse.
Not surprisingly, these laws and policies have resulted in
numerous high profile instances in which the government has silenced
dissenters.345 The regime has pursued journalists, civil society actors
and politicians for straying – even obliquely – from the government’s
approved script.346
One infamous incident involved the 2010 arrest and imprisonment
of Victoire Ingabire, an opposition politician who returned to Rwanda
intending to run for president against Paul Kageme but who was
quickly arrested and silenced.347 Although later convicted of numerous
offenses including organizing an armed insurrection – convictions that
human rights organizations claim were based on fatally flawed
trials348– her initial arrest was based on the fact that she contradicted
the regime’s historical narrative by stating in a public address that Hutu
citizens – not exclusively Tutsis – were killed during the 1994
genocide.349
At around the same time, the government arrested and convicted
a journalist, Agnes Uwimana Nkusi for, among other things, writing
about “ethnicism” and “regionalism” and claiming that they led
Rwandans to end up “killing each other.”350 This statement offended
the Kagame regime by implying that ethnicity is in fact a salient issue
345. See supra note 280.
346. See infra notes 346-358 and accompanying text.
347. See Rwanda: Eight-Year Sentence for Opposition Leader: Victoire Ingabire
Found Guilty of Two Charges in Flawed Trial, H UMAN R IGHTS WATCH (Oct. 30, 2012),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/30/rwanda-eight-year-sentence-opposition-leader
[https://perma.cc/X8FF-WX8G] (archived Oct. 26, 2017).
348. See id.
349. A MNESTY I NTERNATIONAL, J USTICE IN J EOPARDY, supra note 8, at 6 (arguing
Ingabire was arrested for “minimizing the Rwandan genocide” after she gave a speech
addressing Rwanda’s problems with reconciliation and ethnic violence “issues that are rarely
discussed openly in Rwanda”); see Victoire Ingabire: Rwanda Leader’s Jail Term Raised, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25371874 [https://perma.cc/
L7TH-E38C] (archived Oct. 26, 2017).
350. Le Ministère Public v. Uwimana Nkusi (Apr. 4, 2012), Case No. RPA 0061/11/CS
(Rwanda, Afr.), summary available at https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/
agnes-uwimana-nkusi-and-saidati-mukakibibi/ [https://perma.cc/X5AM-T95F] (last visited
Nov. 9, 2017).
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in Rwanda and, worse yet, that Tutsis – presumably RPF soldiers – had
been involved in unjustified killings.351 For those utterances she was
convicted and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment and fined for
“genocide minimization.” 352 For other related offenses, including
writing that President Kagame’s policies favored his own clan, that
high level jobs were reserved for only certain people (presumably
meaning Anglophone Tutsis), and that the army was enriching itself
through its proxy wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo,353 she
was convicted of “threatening national security,” “divisionism,” and
“defaming the President,” all of which added more fines and seven
additional years to her sentence.354
In a further, almost comical, sign of the government’s
determination to control public discourse, especially regarding topics
related to the genocide, in 2012 it arrested a radio announcer and
charged him with “genocide ideology” after he mistakenly mixed up
the terms for “victims” and “survivors” when discussing the
genocide.355 He spent three months in jail before being acquitted and
released.356
Even in the face of condemnation by international human rights
organizations, and even after vowing to reconsider some of the laws
that restrict expression,357 the Rwandan government has continued to
vigorously pursue and punish those who contradict its narrative. One
recent example involved Kizito Mihigo, a well-known Rwandan singer
who in 2014 was arrested, convicted and sentenced to ten years’
imprisonment based partly on a song he wrote in which “he prayed for

351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council Working Group on
Arbitrary Detentions, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at Its
Sixty-Fourth Sessions, 27-31 August 2012 (Nov. 22, 2012), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/wgad/252012.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/6EW5-ERN3] (archived Oct. 26, 2017).
354. Id; Committee to Protect Journalists, supra note 280.
355. See H UMAN R IGHTS W ATCH, R WANDA: EIGHT-Y EAR SENTENCE FOR
O PPOSITION LEADER, supra note 347; see also H UMAN R IGHTS WATCH, LAW AND
R EALITY, supra note 241, at 40 (describing a Rwandan citizen who in 2007 challenged a tenet
of the official “truth” about RPF war crimes and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for
“gross minimization of the genocide”).
356. H UMAN R IGHTS WATCH, R WANDA: EIGHT-Y EAR SENTENCE FOR O PPOSITION
LEADER, supra note 347.
357. See A MNESTY INTERNATIONAL , JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 8.
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victims of the genocide as well as for victims of other violence.”358
Apparently, the government determined that the singer’s reference to
“other violence” implied that Rwandans other than Tutsis had
suffered.359
These are only a few high-profile examples of the Kagame
regime’s legal and extralegal pursuit of perceived opponents,
particularly those who openly question its carefully constructed selfjustifying historical narrative.360 However, it should not be forgotten
that the government carefully monitors and controls ordinary Rwandan
citizens361 and punishes those who stray from the party line.362 Human
rights organizations have documented countless arrests, prosecutions,
disappearances, and assassinations – both inside and outside Rwanda –
of Rwandan citizens from all strata of society that the government
perceives as enemies.363 As others have pointed out, it does not take
many assassinations, disappearances, or convictions before society at
large gets the message that it is safer not to stray from the government’s
approved narrative.364

358. H UMAN R IGHTS W ATCH, R WANDA: EX-MILITARY O FFICERS C ONVICTED O VER
C OMMENTS : I NVESTIGATE A LLEGATIONS OF TORTURE, WITNESS TAMPERING (Apr. 1,
2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/01/rwanda-ex-military-officers-convicted-overcomments [https://perma.cc/UA8Y-YH9Q] (archived Oct. 26, 2017).
359. Id.
360 . See H UMAN R IGHTS W ATCH , R WANDA : R EPRESSION A CROSS B ORDERS:
A TTACKS AND T HREATS A GAINST R WANDAN O PPONENTS AND C RITICS A BROAD (Jan. 28,
2014) https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/28/rwanda-repression-across-borders [https://perma.
cc/2XPC-BBA9] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing that the RPF controlled government has
engaged in “numerous cases of arbitrary arrests, detentions, prosecutions, killings, torture,
enforced disappearances, threats, harassment, and intimidation against government opponents
and critics”).
361. See supra note 259 and accompanying text (describing Rwandan newspaper articles
lauding the increase in rural areas of accusations and prosecutions of genocide ideology).
362. Id.
363. See A MNESTY I NT’ L, 2014/15 R WANDA R EPORT, https://www.amnesty.org/en/
countries/africa/rwanda/report-rwanda/ [https://perma.cc/4U4P-V6QM] (archived Nov. 6,
2017) (arguing Rwandan people are unable to express openly critical views on issues perceived
as sensitive by the authorities); THOMSON, W HISPERING, supra note 76, at 49, 112 (arguing
Rwanda employs “structural forms of violence to suppress and control ordinary Rwandans, and
that they are severely punished if they fail or refuse to play their assigned roles).
364. Schuberth, supra note 133, at 84; Straus, supra note 347, at 60; Amnesty International,
Safer to Stay Silent, supra note 285; SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS, supra note 272, at 17.
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V. CONCLUSION
Rwanda is not the only country in the world that distorts history
and manipulates collective memory. One need look no further than the
United States, where legislators from Texas, Oklahoma and Georgia
have passed laws in recent years that in effect require history teachers
to emphasize American exceptionalism, patriotism, and respect for
authority365 while deemphasizing the US’s troubled racial history.366
Rwanda’s manipulation of collective memory and history,
however, is on a different scale. In the United States, attempts at hamhanded historical distortion tend to emanate from the boondocks. When
regional political powers succeed in altering history textbooks, the
national discourse, led by vocal cognoscenti and backed by a stalwart
First Amendment and a vibrant independent press, hoots in derision
and portrays the would-be “memory entrepreneurs” as ignorant yokels.
In Rwanda, the manipulation of history and collective memory is
carried on by a sophisticated and determined executive that is
unchecked by other branches of government and that aggressively
silences anyone who dares dissent.367
For the time being, Paul Kagame and his ruling coterie can take
heart that their policy of memory entrepreneurship seems to be
working. It is rare that anyone in Rwanda contradicts any aspect of the
regime’s ahistorical version collective memory. 368 When Rwandans
365. Zoe Schlanger, Revised AP U.S. History Standards Will Emphasize American
Exceptionalism, NEWSWEEK (July 29, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/revised-ap-historystandards-will-emphasize-american-exceptionalism-358210 [https://perma.cc/R87C-XBBH]
(archived Oct. 26, 2017).
366. Zoe Schlanger, Newly Revised AP US History Standards Will Take Softer Tone on
Racial History of America, NEWSWEEK (July 30, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/newlyrevised-ap-us-history-standards-take-softer-tone-racial-history-america-358537
[https://perma.cc/QSK4-QP9R] (archived Oct. 26, 2017). Similarly, the State Education Board
in Texas pushed through a sweeping revision of public schools’ history curriculum to depict
“America as a nation chosen by God as a beacon to the world, and free enterprise as the
cornerstone of liberty and democracy.” Chris McGreal, Texas Schools Board Rewrites US
History With Lessons Promoting God and Guns, THE GUARDIAN (May 16, 2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/16/texas-schools-rewrites-us-history
[https://perma.cc/4W6E-HBBF] (archived Oct. 26, 2017). The Texas history revisions included
downplaying the civil rights movement and the US’s history of slavery, “sidelining Thomas
Jefferson, who favored separation of church and state,” and suggesting that Joseph McCarthy’s
infamous anti-communist witch-hunt may have been justified. Id.
367. See infra Part IV.
368. I base this statement partly on the various articles and reports cited in the body of this
paper, and partly on my own observation. I spent approximately six weeks in Rwanda in 2013
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speak of the past, 369 they hew rigidly to the party line: pre-colonial
Rwanda was a peaceful country in which ethnic divisions were absent;
a wise monarch ruled benevolently; the Belgians introduced ethnic
division and taught Rwandans to hate each other; the 1994 genocide
was perpetrated exclusively by hate-filled Hutus against Tutsis; Paul
Kagame and the RPF halted the genocide and are blameless for civilian
killings; the Kagame regime has the moral authority to lead the country
into the future.370
Rwandans’ eerie consistency is a result of the government’s
comprehensive, mostly successful, legal and extralegal efforts to
impose a single collective memory on them, one carefully constructed
to legitimize Paul Kagame’ increasingly autocratic rule.

and five in 2015 leading groups of American university students studying abroad. During my
visits, I interacted regularly with Rwandan academics, governmental officials, and ordinary
Rwandan citizens.
369. My American university students were struck by Rwandans’ reluctance to talk openly
with them. I assigned a research paper that required the students to interview Rwandans – mostly
from the governmental or NGO sectors – about economic and social development in the country.
Practically all of the would-be interviewees declined or dissembled. “I need clearance from
superiors.” “I cannot speak to you unless you have government-approved research
authorization.” Or they simply did not return the telephone calls.
370. See supra Part III.B.
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